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1 Introduction1
1.1 Big data and the conflict of fundamental rights
The problems privacy faces at the wake of 21th century are tremendous. Technological
change is challenging the whole concept of privacy. The Internet allows cheap and easy
monitoring of our behavior, which via behavioral advertising acts as the primary
monetization motor for the free services offered across the cyberspace.2 Internet users do
not have control of their personal data or privacy, although this right is a fundamental one.
At the same time, there exist economic incentives to both use more data and use the
existing data to a greater extent; a too strict a privacy regulation could block this area of
economic activity, which would be against the fundamental rights of the data controllers as
legal persons also causing welfare losses to the whole community. The research question
of this thesis is the secondary use of data, especially in the commercial context. Secondary
use of data is a broad term. It can be understood as all of the further activities done with the
data other than the initially stated purpose of the collection. The currently available
solution for the conflict of principle rights is anonymization. 3 An alternative solution, from
commercial perspective, in some cases, is non-compliance with the data protection
regimen.4 The  current  lack  of  enforcement  is  a  big  problem  for  a  consumer’s  right  to
privacy. To be more specific, the problem is in the frequency sanctions are given and in the
monetary value of the sanctions.5 Without safeguarding, the right to privacy is a dead letter
of the law, de lege ferenda strengthening enforcement could be the solution to non-
compliant secondary use of data. Sanctions do not however facilitate the use of personal
1In addition to my supervisor Kristian Siikavirta, I would like to thank Tobias Bräutigam for excellent
guidance and comments on this thesis and for good and educational discussions about data protection.
Additional thanks go to Riikka Koulu for commenting the fundamental law perspective and structure of this
thesis.
2 Interestingly, majority of people using the internet in EU state that they would not like to disclose personal
data in exchange for free services. This raises the question whether the users actually understands the amount
of data collected. SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 359 Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity
in the European Union, 2011, p. 33.
3 Anonymization is the technique rendering personal data in such a form that there are no personal identifiers
left, and the data thus becomes anonymous. I will treat this issue more in the chapter 3.
4This solution can be used if the legislation set by data protection directive is followed. It is however
important to note that the authorities have problems following and enforcing the data protection directive.
5 For example in Finland there are no sanctions in place for violations of the Personal Data Act, the same
scenario applies for Ireland and Austria as well. In certain European jurisdictions sanctions are given out
more frequently – however in these areas the monetary value of the sanctions creates the problem.
2data – there is a clear need for using data, and too strict rules in combination with strict
enforcement could kill the free market in this area, and remove the ‘free services’ available
for  consumers.  This  also  applies  to  the  small  and  medium  enterprises,  which  could  be
brought down by a single big sanction or additional compliance costs. Too strict data
protection rules, in combination with strong enforcement, would prevent new players from
entering the cyberspace market; big established companies have a much stronger position
for adapting to regulatory changes. This brings forth the need for comprehensive solutions,
which include both the text of the law, as well as enforcement actions (law in action).  A
new risk-based approach to secondary use of data is needed, in combination with a strong
and uniform enforcement regimen.
The emphasis of this thesis is on the regulatory side. The goal is to find guidance for a pan-
European regulation on the secondary use of data, which would solve the conflict of
privacy and utility. This conflict on the level of fundamental rights is essentially about
weighting privacy against the importance of functioning online or information technology
markets – that could bring wealth and efficiency across industries as well as to consumers.
Big data highlights the importance of solving this question. Big data is collections of
information of extreme size and complexity, usually so extensive that traditional
computing methods would not be able to analyze the information. As defined in the IT
glossary of the consulting firm Gartner:
“Big data is high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets
that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for
enhanced insight and decision making.”6
I would supplement this definition by certain practical examples of big data. Technologies
such as data visualization are needed to analyze the data. Analyzed data can be extremely
useful in different processes from profiled marketing to predictive analytics.7 The privacy
aspects of big data arise when the data sets contain information that is identifiable or
connectable to a specific individual. From the perspective of the individual, this data
creates a risk of infringement of privacy. The data controller’s economic interest is to
monetize or otherwise use the data as a part of running their business. The data protection
laws however put the controller in a position where their job is also to protect the
fundamental rights of the data subjects. This dual role of the controller causes problems if
6Gartner, 2013 It-Glossary
7Siegel 2013
3sufficient enforcement and administrative oversight is not in place, as the common saying
goes:
“Like the fox guarding the chicken coop”
The data controller has interests from benefiting from the data, while simultaneously there
are obligations to follow.
The term secondary use of data is derived from the purpose restriction defined in article 7
of the DPD or Section 7 of the Finnish Personal Data Act. Personal data can only be used
for the predefined purposes, which the data subjects are aware of. Secondary uses of data
are the possible uses for personal data, which have not been primary reasons for collection.
As an example, an e-commerce company could collect personal data to deliver their
customers products. As a secondary use this data could be used to create consumption
models or profiles.
I want to draw attention to two aspects of big data. First,  more  and  more  information  is
collected; every web-based service contains increasing amounts of customer data; from
purchase history to location data and records of Internet behavior. In addition, other service
providers also collect data, such as credit card records, club membership data, location data
from mobile devices, social media feeds and marked preferences, contacts or interests in
services like Facebook8. Second, the multiple modern data processing technologies that
have increased computing power in combination with advanced analytics, allow combining
and analyzing sets of data and finding patterns and correlations from the data. New
information is thus created from previously existing data.9 This second aspect of big data is
especially problematic from the perspective of personal data and privacy. This is due to the
basis of our data protection legislation; data is collected with the informed consent for data
collection and for a certain purpose. Especially important is the fact that data is collected
only for a single purpose, as an example address data for deliveries of e-commerce goods.
The current legal framework does not sufficiently answer the problem of secondary use.10
Law is lagging behind technological change. Computing capacity has significantly
8Feed is an entry to the social media, for example, Facebook allows sharing certain thoughts to social media
contacts.
9 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, p.  107, for example Harford has claimed that Big Data does not
remove the problems that exist within statistical research, the size of the data sets my in fact lead to more
mistakes. Harford, 2014.
10Also the MacKinsey report on big data captures this aspect of regulation lagging behind: “Policy makers
need to recognize the potential of harnessing big data to unleash the next wave of growth in their economies.
4increased in the last 20 years.11 The current European Union legislation was created before
Internet usage was widespread. The current privacy legislation does not answer to the
specific aspects of big data12, profiling or cloud computing.13 Even if the legislations were
adequate, the problem would be its enforcement. If not enforced, regulation does not
protect  fundamental  rights.  Enforcement  is  seen  as  a  key  issue  in  the  regulation  of
secondary use of data, since the current shortcomings of enforcement challenge the whole
essence of data protection laws. Effective enforcement, in combination with risk-based
approach, would allow the secondary use of data in a manner that both safeguards the data
subjects’ fundamental rights as well as allows economic growth in the next wave of data-
based services and industrialization.14
The conflict between privacy laws and the information economy is worsened due to the
fast growing value of data. This value is captured well in this popular quotation:
 “Data is the new oil” – Clive Humby15
Infonomics analyzes the value of data and sheds light on the claim that data is the new oil.
This discipline or sub-science of economics assesses the value of information. If data is
seen as the new oil of economy, it has to be valuated.16
The Internet is a powerful and unique environment for marketing, as it collects and
contains an enormous wealth of data from an economics perspective; it thus facilitates
segmented marketing, and as such captures a larger share of the surplus, as segmented
marketing allows a much higher diffraction of prices for products.17 The importance of
They need to provide the institutional framework to allow companies to easily create value out of data while
protecting the privacy of citizens and providing data security. Manyika and others, 2011, p. 13 see also p. 63.
11For the increasing technologic capacity see Moore’s law, which states that the number of transistors in
circuits doubles approximately every two years.
http://www.computerhistory.org/semiconductor/timeline/1965-Moore.html.
12There are multiple problems that big data create, equality of the consumer pricing for example as well as
accuracy of the data used in cases when analyzing consumer credit risk might cause problems. For a review
of the shortcomings of Big Data in the credit rating sector see for example Persis, McLaughlin and Levy
2014.
13Cloud computing may be defined as offering services thorough Internet. According to Milliard and Hong
cloud computing may be one of the technologies allowing to benefit from big data, in more technical terms
cloud computing is not dependent of the used location and the capacity can be used by demand.  For more
information on cloud computing see, Millard 2013, p. 1.
14Varian and Shapiro provide a good overview about Economics of the Information age and the old rules
applying see Shapiro Varian, 1999, see of big data’s role in increasing economic efficiency; Manyika and
others, 2011.
15Palmer 2014.
16 Laney’s infonomics is an emerging theory that claims that information is an asset class. Information is seen
as an actual asset; that can be quantified and internally accounted. Infonomics is not focused on personal
data; the focus is on all information in general.  The major thesis of the theory is that value of information
should be valuated and analyzed, so the data can be used efficiently. See more, Laney, 2012.
17Craig and Lundloff 2011, p. 52 - 53.
5infonomics arises from the fact that the importance of data collection and different data-
mining techniques are on the rise.  Companies have the possibility for improving
performance and gaining savings with powerful utilization of big data. According to
MacKinsey Global Institute, there are various areas in which personal data usage could
efficiently be used for increasing productivity and economic gains.18 These data groups
include, for instance, location data in retail, health care data as a source for improving
medical service, as well as financial data.19An example in the area of retail and marketing
could be data about activities in both electronic and physical stores20
This thesis will analyze the legal construct of secondary use of data, and see whether
anonymization can solve the conflict between freedom of trade and privacy.21 In the
secondary use of data, this thesis will focus especially on purpose restriction and the
legitimate  grounds  for  data  processing.  In  addition,  enforcement  of  privacy  is  seen  as  a
vital part of the subject, since without proper enforcement the data controllers do not have
the incentive to protect privacy in the form of effective anonymization.  My thesis is that
anonymization would give a clear answer to the conflict between commercial value of data
and privacy. Big data increases the need for enforcement since the economic gains create
incentive to break privacy regulation and without regulation the individual right of privacy
cannot be fulfilled.
In the European Union data protection legislation is harmonized with a directive, which is
implemented nationally in 28 different manners. In the following chapters, the European
directive and the data protection rules and how they affect anonymization and enforcement
are examined and explained.
From a constitutional perspective, this thesis interprets the conflict of economic value
(rights for doing business and to functioning markets) against the fundamental right of
privacy. Some limitations to the scope have to be done, since the thesis consists of various
topics and they could easily be expanded.
18Manyika and others 2011, p. 100.
19Manyika and others 2011, pp. 39, 52, 63, 72 - 74 and 127.
20 Modern technology allows monitoring movements both in the virtual e-commerce stores as well as in
physical locations that contain for example Wi-Fi, also the store cameras can be used to analyzed eye
movements. The stored information can for example includes the time spend looking certain items or the
mouse movements or ‘click-stream’ in the online context. See more about monitoring in stores and targeted
ads, Morran 2013 and Popescu, 2013.
21To some extent the question, whether anonymization alone is sufficient needs to be raised. Schneier has for
example brought up the problems of anonymization Schneier 2007; see also Ohm 2010, p. 1704 - 1705.
61.2 Multilayered research question and previous research
My thesis falls under category of information law, with an economics and law focus on the
analysis. In the background, there is a visible wider fundamental rights conflict between
free market values and the right to privacy, and the changes in their balance due to
technologic change. This greater “superquestion” locates this thesis to the field of
information law, more specifically data protection law. Further elements are derived from
EU law, since the harmonization efforts in Europe are driven by the EU. There are no
previous studies either about the risk-based approach to privacy in Finland or about
secondary use of data.22 In fact, the majority of research about big data, privacy and
anonymization is of Anglo-American origin. Pöysti has previously applied the economic
method on data protection issues in his doctoral thesis “Tehokkuus, informaatio ja
eurooppalainen oikeusalue”.23 In  the  area  themes  such  as  anonymization  or  purpose
limitation, there are multiple international publications concerning these themes.24 Data
protection and privacy are popular subjects, so more research emerges every day both
globally and locally.
The research question of this thesis is what is commercial secondary use of personal data
and how could it benefit from a risk-based approach? The thesis aims to solve the conflict
between privacy of individuals and commercial interests. The research question contains
multiple aspects. The first is about the problems and challenges the current regulation is
facing due increasing economic pressures, and whether it can efficiently solve those
problems. The second question is whether it is possible to solve the described problems by
a risk-based approach to regulation. The three areas analyzed in connection with the Data
Protection Directive (DPD) are the provisions and principles that limit or allow the
secondary use of data. Most notably DPD articles 6(b) purpose limitation, 7(a) consent
based processing 7(f) legitimate interest. Anonymization is also analyzed, since it acts
currently as the best possible solution for the secondary uses of data and it can provide
much support for the risk-based approach. Enforcement has a dual role in the research
question, first the lack of enforcement causes problems, second sufficient and efficient
levels of sanctions could act as an important solution for the problems privacy is facing
22A thesis has been published about the recombination of data. See, Pakkanen, Tomi: Combination of
Personal Data and the Data Protection Reform in the European Law, Edilex, 2014
23 Pöysti, 1999.
24Just naming a few Brouwer, 2011, Ohm, 2009-2010, Ohm, 2012, Schwartz, 2012-2013 and Yakowitz,
2011-2012.
7currently. I will also analyze if data protection regulation could benefit from a risk-based
regulation. The chosen approach to the research question could be described as a
multilayered approach.25 A wide array of topics from anonymization to purpose restriction
and enforcement are analyzed, this is however necessary for capturing the essence of
secondary use of data.
The research question is of multidisciplinary nature, and it thus falls under the subjects of
data protection and law and economics. Protection of personal data is commonly located
under the concept of information law.26 According to both Pöysti and Voutilainen
information law, includes the questions of privacy, protection of personal data, publicity of
data, tele-activities, electronic commerce and data security law.27 Data protection law is the
primary context of this thesis. Data protection law or privacy law28 is part of administrative
law or information law, but it is also strongly entwined with law of obligations, especially
when analyzing consent.29 As Bräutigam has noted data protection law is of technical
nature and addresses information technology.30 In the Nordic context, data protection law
has been seen as part of computing law or information law.31 There are, however, certain
problems in this systemization and a computing law or information law school has not
clearly emerged.32 Saarenpää views protection of privacy as part of personality rights, but
also partly as a problem analyzed in information law.33 Saarenpää has also noted that the
fact that the notion of privacy becomes judicial leads automatically to the fragmentation of
the research of privacy.34 From the perspective of this thesis it is important to note that
privacy can be studied from multiple perspectives, the school of information law provides
some  support  in  the  form  of  principles.  It  is,  however,  so  that  currently  neither  data
25 Siltala has stated that academic text contains two levels: the first is ‘metatext’, the frame, borders, premises
and goals of the research, the second level being the ‘object’, containing the true/untrue valuations. Siltala,
2013, p. 247.
26 Although the school of information law, as well as data protection law are both young members of the
legal doctrine and legal education
27Some differences exist between the classifications, for example, Voutilainen also adds freedom of speech
under  information  law and does  not  include  the  commercial  aspects  as  strongly  as  Pöysti.  Pöysti,  p.  368 –
370 and Voutilainen, 2012, pp. 34 - 35.
28 Data  protection  is  the  European  term  used,  in  the  Anglo-American  context  privacy  law  is  used  as  a
synonymous; I will through my thesis employ both terms privacy and data protection.
29Data protection law can be assigned to to various schools of law, for example, Bygrave has classified data
protection law to be closely related with administrative law and human rights law, Bygrave, 2002,p. 166.
30Bräutigam, 2012, p. 415.
31Seipel, 1977, p. 124.
32Seipels views have, however, changed as can be seen from Seipel 2004, pp. 269 - 270, 272. Pöysti has also
noted this Pöysti, 1999, p. 368 - 369, see also Saarenpää on the nature of information law Saarenpää, 2009b,
p. 44.
33Saarenpää, 2009b, p. 7.
34Saarenpää, 2009a, p. 366.
8protection nor information law have clearly taken their place as independent doctrines, in
the future this may be the case, as information law becomes more vital for the tools of each
lawyer.
The focus of the research question leaves certain areas outside of the research. I will
conduct the analysis of law especially keeping in mind the commercial or so-called private
sector data processing.35 The end-goal is that a balance is struck between individuals’ right
to privacy and a functioning market. The rights that will be balanced are the property rights
and  economic  rights  of  those  processing  the  data;  against  the  right  to  privacy  the
individuals (data subjects) carry. The fact that most of data collectors are private
companies, and that the purposes for data analysis and collection are commercial, should
be taken to account.
Although the recent news of NSA and other foreign and counter-intelligence operations
receiving information from the commercial sector would justify a different focus, within
the scope of the work in hand it is not possible to inspect this to a sufficient degree.36 It is,
however, important to mention since, in many cases, the question has been the access to
private databases, the importance of secondary data collection is high. Companies collect
data that the government then might access. The historical description of privacy and data
protection laws is also left to a minimum, since the contribution offered would not justify
the excursion to the history of data protection. In addition, such historical analysis would
not help in solving the research question. Questions and areas balancing free speech and
privacy are left untouched, since they do not have an important role when analyzing the
secondary use of personal data.
The next subchapter will analyze the chosen methodology, which is used to frame and
solve the research question. The chosen methodology could be defined briefly as risk-
based law and economics analysis of regulatory activities and current statutes, with legal
dogmatic analysis as a support function.
35This leaves for example the purely research use of for example medical data outside of the scope. Some
examples of medical data being used after anonymization will be, however, used.
36The public sector processing of data is left outside the scope, even though especially the PRISM project and
the so-called 2013 Snowden revelations have caused much discussion of privacy. I see these issues more
political than in the field of law. More information about the Snowden revelations and the full history of
Snowden can be read from the book of Snowden Files by Luke Harding.
91.3 Twofold methodology
I employ a twofold methodology to answer the research question. The core of methodology
in my thesis is law and economics, which I apply for de lege ferenda analysis and for
explaining the current environment in which the law operates.37 Law and economics helps
conceptually binding together the value (and monetization) of data as well as setting
effective level of sanctions, that would be needed for safeguarding the e-consumers right to
privacy. More specifically the used law and economics method leans towards a risk-based
understanding of regulatory activities. I will additionally employ legal dogmatic analysis to
analyze the current legal norms on the secondary use of data, enforcement of unauthorized
data use, and anonymization.
This thesis analyzes fundamental right to privacy and weighs it against the economic
reality, discussing the nature of privacy as a right. The role of law and economics is
important since it helps to provide answers to the problems in the current legal reality,
especially answering whether a statute is efficient and how it allocates resources and
liabilities.38 In addition, as stated by Pöysti, law and economics further clarifies the effects
of a norm and acts as a comparative tool for the analysis of law.39 Legal dogmatic analysis
and law and economics have very different view on what is law; legal dogmatic analysis
analyzes the law from within, law and economics from outside.40 I use law and economics
to analyze the question how the current law should be changed or if it should be changed.
Law and economics can be defined as the application of economic theory to examine the
law and the impacts of law to the surrounding economic reality.41 Law and economics can
be especially useful when analyzing efficiency of laws or sanctions. In addition, law and
economics help to identify the economic effects of laws for different parties.42
The fundamental rights aspect of this thesis needs to be analyzed by the traditional legal
dogmatic approach, due the institutional roots of human and fundamental rights. Legal
dogmatic method acts as the secondary method of this thesis. I use it mainly as a tool to
analyze the current directive, statutes and proposed EU regulation. It also helps balancing
37 The chosen approach is following Mackaays description,  institutional, since law and economics is used for
the analysis of legal institutions and the way they affect individuals, Mackaay, 1982, p. 4.
38Mähönen, 2004, p. 49 and Mercuro and Medema, 1997, p. 23.
39 For an example on use of law and economics on the field of information law see Pöysti, 1999, p. 49.
40Law  and  economics  sees  law  as  vaguely  as  possible  to  explain  the  effects  of  law.  The  whole  sum  of
combined political-legal structure is seen as the object of study. Mercuro and Medema, pp. 21. - 22.
41Mercuro and Medema, 1997, p. 3.
42Friedman, 2000, pp. 18 - 19.
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the conflicting fundamental rights.43 Aarnio has described the legal dogmatic method to
mean the description of legal norms; more precisely, it includes the definition and
systemization of the legal norms.44 In some parts of the thesis, I take comparative sources
from the various European jurisdictions, bringing a comparative aspect to the used legal
dogmatic method.45 The purpose of these European excursions is to show examples of the
implementation of EU law. However, the purpose is not to venture deep into legal
comparison, since this would be impossible and it would not help further in answering the
research question. Additionally, the method is in some scenarios used to bring analogy
from  environmental  law  and  competition  law  to  the  discussion  about  sanctions,  or  for
excursions to the United States context.
When analyzing the superquestion of fundamental rights colliding, the legal dogmatic
method is influence by the idea of a systemization that is responsive to the fundamental
rights. In his research Pöyhönen has analyzed this ‘responsive approach’ to fundamental
rights in the context of property law:
”The result of the responsive approach to the fundamental rights is that the
norms of property law become more responsive to fundamental rights… The
application of the norms of property law has to be analyzed following the
principle of proportionality, by asking how much maintaining the
fundamental rights of an interest party endangers or disrupts the fundamental
rights of the other interest party.” (Translated by the author)46
The essence of this idea is that when applying fundamental rights in the context of property
law, we must ask the question of how the protection of fundamental  rights applies to the
fundamental rights of the other party. This approach works particularly well in the area of
data protection and secondary use of data, where increasing the fundamental rights of the
controller affects the fundamental rights of the data subject instantly and vice-versa. This is
due the fact that information law is strongly in connection with fundamental rights.47 In
practice, this balancing of fundamental rights of different interest groups must be done in a
way that rights are not limited in a draconian way.
43Siltala states that one of the basic functions of legal dogmatic analysis is the weighing and balancing of
legal principles and fundamental rights that have enough institutional standing. See more Siltala, 2003, p.
138.
44Aarnio, 1986, pp. 110 - 111.
45This is due the fact that when doing research in the field of data protection (or information law), the legal
dogmatic approach needs to take into account the international nature of information and the fact that much
of the information laws have an international birth history. Saarenpää, 2009b, p. 15.
46Original Finnish text: “Perusoikeusmyönteisen systematisoinnin seuraus on varallisuusoikeuden normisto
perusoikeusherkkyyden vahvistuminen… Varallisuusoikeudellisen normiston soveltamisharkinta on
suhteellisuusperiaatteen mukaisesti, jäsennettävä kysymällä, missä määrin yhden intressitahon
perusoikeussuojatun aseman ylläpitäminen haittaa tai vaarantaa toisen tason asemaa.”, Pöyhönen, 2003, p.
78.
47Bygrave 2002, pp. 166 - 167.
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The risk-based approach helps balancing the conflicting fundamental rights, in a way that
would protect data subjects’ rights, while at the same time allowing commercial secondary
use of data. The adaptation of a risk-based approach can be justified by Beck’s
classification of social risks:
“Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced
and introduced by modernization itself.”48
In the context of my thesis, the risks are either man-made or technologic risks. The concept
of risk is a powerful tool for understanding regulation. In the context of secondary use of
data the risk-based methodology analyzes the potential uses of personal data versus the
potential losses of individual privacy of the data subjects. This helps to further anchor risk
to the fundamental rights, the loss of privacy is seen as the ultimate risk, and the amount of
data and the sensitivity of data acts as the measuring instrument. Julia Black has classified
risk in regulation to four categories:
“Risk is an object of regulation in that much regulatory activity is defined in
terms of risk. Risk plays a justificatory role in that it defines the object and
purpose of, and provides a justification for, regulation, and thus frames
regulatory policy making. Risk plays an organisational and procedural role
in that risk provides the basis for the regulator to operationalise its objectives
and for the introduction of particular sets of internal organisational policies
and processes.”49
This definition of the role of risk by Black is optimal since in privacy-related risk all of the
four areas are fulfilled. First, privacy regulation should de lege ferenda concentrate on the
management of risks; the justification of data protection regimens is to protect individuals
against the loss of privacy. In addition, the organizational and procedural role of risk is
extremely  well  in  place  for  internal  privacy  processes.  As  well,  this  plays  as  a  source  to
analyze the actions that should be done in relation to enforcement and anonymization.
Hence risk-based regulation can be adjusted in several situations to meet changes of the
environment internally (institutional changes)  as  well  as  when  technology  changes  the
surrounding reality (technological changes). I will further analyze the risk-based regulation
and the application of such approach in the chapter 5.
This thesis is built with a variety of sources, from different levels; the most important
sources are the legislation and EU directives and other regulation on the issues at hand.
The following subchapter will present the most important sources and official material
48Beck 1992, p. 21.
49Black, 2010a, p. 1, chapter 14.1
12
used to analyze the set research question. I will also analyze the hierarchy of norms, and
choose an approach that serves the selected material and methodology best.
1.4 Sources of the research and hierarchy of norms
This thesis treats especially European data protection law from a law and economics
perspective. The traditional Nordic or Finnish school of legal dogmatic of a Peznick-
Aarnio-origin, it does not give international material, consequentialist arguments or for
example EU law much value.50 Siltala has given EU law, principles and international law
more  weight  in  his  hierarchy  of  norms,  “dynamic hierarchy of norms or responsive
hierarchy of norms” noting the value of EU law as an institutional source of law. Siltala
also includes international comparative material as a possible non-institutional source of
law. His model also includes economic arguments and consequentialist arguments as
possible non-institutional sources.51 My  thesis  employs  this dynamic-model,  since  the
thesis derives from a multitude of international, EU and economic arguments.
The most important source for data protection laws is the EU. The EU has harmonized
national data protection statutes by a directive, and the Commission aims to regulate data
protection by a regulation. For this reason, the role of EU law has to be taken into account
in the hierarchy of norms, even though the national implementation of data protection
directive is not affected directly by EU law. EU law is an autonomic international legal
system that can create obligations and rights to individuals within the Member States.52
The doctrine that EU law can limit Member States sovereign rights was first discussed in
Van Gend en Loos.53 The ECJ first established the supremacy of EU law in Costa v. Enel.54
In the legal hierarchy, the supremacy of the EU law sets it to the highest position, above
national law.55 In addition to EU law the role of law and economics in the hierarchy of
norms  has  to  be  accounted.  The  role  of  EU  law  is  important,  but  in  the  current  state  of
affairs, the supremacy does not have similar role that it could have in future after the
50Aarnio 1987, pp. 89 - 90.
51 Siltala 2003, pp. 896 - 897.
52Tuomas Ojanen 2010, p. 35.
53Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963.NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tariefcommissie -
Netherlands. Case 26-62.
54Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964. Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L Reference for a preliminary ruling:
Giudice conciliatore di Milano - Italy.  ECJ Case 6-64.
55 P. Craig and De Burca 2011, pp. 256 - 257.
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regulation is valid. Directives do not give directly rights to the citizens, unless the member
state has not failed to implement them.56
According to Tolonen the role of law and economics in legal dogmatic argumentation falls
under the category consequentialist argument. Siltala in the other hand has defined the role
of economic arguments as independent non-institutional sources in his dynamic hierarchy
of legal sources.57 Siltala has analyzed the role of law and economics as method and its
role in the hierarchy of law; he has noted that the usability of law and economic varies by
the field of law, and that in many cases the institutional roots such as the constitution still
needs to be considered. According to Siltala, the arguments of economics have more effect
in areas that are connected with trade and commerce.58 In my thesis,  this is  precisely the
case, law and economics is important since data protection is strongly in connection with
the online economy.
The most important source of law for my thesis is the data protection directive, although
there is variation in the implementation of the directive.59 In addition to the directive, I will
also especially interpret the Finnish Personal Data Act (Henkilötietolaki 1999/523) and  in
some cases for additional perspectives the Spanish Ley Orgánica de Protección de Datos
de Carácter Personal (LOPD) and the United Kingdom Data Protection Act. These national
laws are used as examples of implementation.60 The future proposed EU regulation, the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is also taken into account when considering
the secondary use of data and sanctions. When analyzing the sanctions I will take into
account the original Commission proposal and the Parliament amendments to the
sanctions. GDPR has most recently been accepted in the European Parliament and the
implementation is forecasted to start in 2015.61  The GDPR contains many elements for the
future of data processing and big data, most notably the articles 22 and 23 contain duties
for increasing accountability and data protection by design in companies.62
Working  Party  29  plays  an  important  role  in  the  interpretation  of  the  DPD  as  well  as
advising on data protection issues. The Working Party is established by article 29 of the
56 See more about the implementation of directives P. Craig and De Burca, 2011, p. 106 and Ojanen, 2010,
pp. 43 - 44.
57Tolonen 2003, p. 152 and 164.
58 Siltala, 2011, pp. 109 - 111.
59Even though there is variation in the implementation, Raab & Bennett have stated that the DPD is by far the
most important instrument governing data protection, Bennett and Raab 2006, p. 93.
60 The purpose is not analyzing the differences or to give detailed analysis about the national statutes.
61Commission, MEMO 14/186.
62 I will not concentrate my analysis in these changes, since in this point is still two hard to say how they
would affect the data processors see more, GDPR, p. 56.
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DPD, its duties are listed in the article 30.WP 29 acts as an independent advisory body,
consisting of representatives from the Member State DPAs.63 As  also  Kuner  notes,  the
working party has an influential role in data protection, since it often provides opinions on
unclear issues or new problems caused by development of technology; often crystallizing
the interpretation of the DPD.64 However, it should be recognized that the WP 29 opinions
are  not  binding  by  the  nature  of  law.  Even  though,  the  opinions  of  WP 29  act  as  crucial
source material for this thesis, shedding light on multiple issues arising in connection with
secondary use of data and anonymization. Especially the recent opinions on
anonymization, interpretation of article 7(f) and purpose restriction are used for analyzing
the DPD.65 It is however important to note that the opinions and recommendations the
working party publishes, are not binding.66  In a conflicting case,  it  could thus always be
stated that the law should be interpret differently from the guidance of WP 29.
I will also use local DPAs official guidelines and decisions to look for guidance on the new
issues. I will in this area derive especially from the guidance from the Information
Commissioners Office (ICO) and Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés
(CNIL).67There is few only very few material from the Finnish DPA regarding the
questions around anonymization, risk management or big data.68 As  of  official  court
decisions I will analyze several relevant cases from the ECJ.
When analyzing the effectiveness of sanctions in chapter 4, I will analyze certain US based
Federal Trade Commission decisions alongside with sanctions issued by European DPAs.
These will clarify the varying enforcement processes and levels of sanctions at the
different sides of Atlantic. The goal is to shed light on the law in action of data protection.
The US material is used as a complementary source that benefits de lege ferenda and
illuminates to the potential ways of improving the current enforcement. In addition I will
also use the preparatory materials of the GDPR and reports by the European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to analyze the current state of sanctions.
63 WP 29 is  independent  of  the  local  DPAs,  Members  States  as  well  as  the  Commission  see,  e.g.  Bygrave
2002, p. 73.
64Kuner 2007, p. 9.
65WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, Opinion 05/2014 and Opinion 03/2013.
66Bygrave 2002, p. 73.
67These guidelines are for the French and UK context, and thus not applicable law in Finland or other
Member States, they however address issues that are similarly implemented in many jurisdictions. CNIL,
2012a  and CNILb ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice 2012 and ICO
2014, Big data and data protection.
68There are the comments on the Finnish national big data strategy, Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto 2014,
Tietosuojavaltuutetun lausunto liikenne- ja viestintäministeriön asettaman työryhmän valmistelemasta
kansallisen big data -strategian luonnoksesta.
15
In the field of legal literature, the material is a mixture of Finnish and international
publications and journals. Just to mention some of the most influential publications in
relation with this thesis; in the field of anonymization a key article is the controversial
paper written by Ohm69, where he claims that anonymization is dead. Opposing Ohms
view, I will consider the claims of Yakowitz.70 From the Finnish scholarship Saarenpää
and Pöysti the most stage time.71 The material from economics of privacy varies highly,
consisting  critics  of  privacy,  such  as  Posner  or  Acquisti  who  has  used  behavioral
economics in his analysis.72 When exploring regulation, the most important publications of
this thesis are by Robert  Baldwin and Julia Black, who have explored and analyzed risk-
based regulation.73 In the area of risk-based approach, I will also derive form the CIPL
white papers on risk-based approach.74 However, it should be noted that CIPL consists of
private entities, which might have goals to influence the future of privacy regulation.
The following subchapter will briefly explain the structure of this thesis; it serves as a road
map to this thesis.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis analyses first the current legal reality, venturing then via sanction to the
analysis of future legal concepts that might facilitate the secondary use of data. In the
second chapter of this thesis I will treat the current legislation around the secondary use of
data. The fundamental rights conflict will be assessed and taken into account, also noting
the goal for safeguarding the free flow of data as a goal for data protection laws. This acts
as the superquestion or conflict of fundamental rights, which frames the whole issue. I will
analyze the fundamental right of privacy and weight it against the fundamental rights of the
data controller. The focus is on the DPD, and on some of its European implementations –
most notably the Finnish implementation.
In the third chapter, anonymization is analyzed as the technical solution for allowing
secondary use of data. In this area, the interest is on the current norms on anonymization.
The risk of re-identification will also be treated. In the commercial context, the value of
69Ohm 2009-2010.
70 Yakowitz 2011-2012.
71Pöysti 1999T and Saarenpää 2009b.
72Acquisti, Leslie and Loewenstein. 2009, Posner, 1977-1978 and Posner, 1978.
73Black and Baldwin, 2010, Black, 2010b and Black 2010a.
74 CIPL 2014a and CIPL 2012b.
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data is important and for that reason, the devaluation of data utility will be analyzed. Focus
will be on the use of anonymization as a safeguard. The issue will be analyzed from the
perspective of the risk of re-identification, which is an important part of the issue for the
data subject and additionally from the perspective of the controllers seeking to authorize
commercial activities by anonymizing data.
In the fourth chapter, I will analyze the enforcement of unauthorized data use, or more
generally how are privacy violations sanctioned. The chapter also contains an excursion to
the current data protection and enforcement in the United States. Especially the role of
FTC  and  the  sanctions  given  will  be  explored.  The  role  of  this  US  excursion  is  to  shed
comparative light on the monetary effects of sanctions. European sanctions will be
compared to the sanctions given out by the FTC.
The fifth chapter will discuss the economic aspects of privacy and apply those as a
background material to the risk-based approach. The risk-based regulation will provide
input for de lege ferenda solutions. Finally, the goal is to apply the risk-based approach as
a model for data use and provide solutions to the problems of the current DPD. The goal is
to demonstrate how the risk-based approach could better solve the conflict of fundamental
rights.
The next chapter will analyze the current norms on commercial secondary data use.  The
analysis starts by describing the fundamental rights conflict in question. Most notably, the
right to privacy will be analyzed.
2 Commercial Secondary Use of Data
2.1 Colliding Fundamental Rights
This subchapter illuminates the conflicting fundamental rights that are behind the
secondary commercial use of data. This is referred as the “super-question or meta-
question” of this thesis, since the conflict of privacy and commercial interests also affects
many other subjects than the use of secondary data.75  This  excursion  to  the  conflicting
fundamental rights of the data controllers and data subjects is needed for better
understanding the collision of fundamental rights. This collision of fundamental rights is
75The conflict could also be formulated as the conflict between citizens’ rights versus the rights of commerce
or business. However, it should be noted that there are also societal benefits in the use of data and individuals
do benefit from the free services offered to them.
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caused by the dualistic nature of data protection law: on the other hand, data protection
laws exist to protect the privacy of data subjects - the consumers using online services, at
the same time, one of the goals of data protection laws is to allow economic activities and
safeguard free movement of data.76 This dualistic nature is shown further in for example
when conducting  the  balancing  test  of  DPD article  7(f)  (legitimate interest of controller)
and considering the correct levels of anonymization (utility vs privacy).77 Lee Bygrave has
compared data protection laws to policies of sustainable development in the area of
environmental law, these on one hand protect environment and on the other allow
economic growth.78
Privacy is a fundamental right. Data protection can also be viewed as an individual
fundamental right.79 The freedom of trade and the free market can also be seen as a
fundamental right, this is according to Länsineva is the institutional part of protection of
property.80 As  noted  by  the  Commission  and  in  the  article  52  of  the  Charter  of
Fundamental Rights in Europe no fundamental right is ultimate and the limitations in other
rights need to be necessary.81 In  EU,  privacy  or  right  to  privacy  is  a  principle  right
protected  by  the  article  7  of  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  the
article 8 acknowledges the right to data protection as a separate right. The charter also
safeguards commercial activities in articles; 15 right to choose occupation article, right to
conduct business article 16 and right to property article 17. European Convention of
Human Rights protects privacy in the article 8. The section 10 of the Finnish constitution
grants the right to privacy or integrity. The constitution also protects the right to conduct in
commercial activity in article 18. In the case of secondary use of data, these two groups of
fundamental rights are in a conflicting relationship. I would also like to bring a third level
to this collusion – it is about the utility and societal benefits, use of data – even commercial
use, has societal benefits it raises welfare and stimulates economic activities. This can be
seen both in the generation of jobs in the internet sector and also in free services and
cheaper prices for the consumers.82
76GDPR, p. 6 - 7.
77Subchapters 2.5 and 3.3.
78Bygrave 2002, p. 167.
79For the purpose of exploring the secondary use of data it is not important to distinguish privacy and data
protection as fundamental rights.
80Länsineva 2011, p. 558.
81GDPR, p. 7.
82This aspect of the collision will be explored more in the subchapter 5.1, where I explore the economic
aspects of privacy. See also Deighton and Quelch, 2009 and Varian.  In the other side there are fears that big
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There are two important aspects in the balancing of fundamental rights, first the legislator
should be the party conducting the balancing test via legislation, and second, that the
balancing should not affect the core of a fundamental right. The goal in such balancing
activities is that both of the fundamental rights can operate as much as possible.83 For
operating  and  considering  the  balancing  of  privacy  against  other  rights,  it  is  essential  to
first explore the nature of privacy.
There are two different approaches, the first one is the US view of seeing privacy as liberty
and a protection against the state; the second, European view, is seeing privacy more as a
right  to  human  dignity,  which  works  both  against  the  state  and  private  parties.84 This
integrity based approach can be clearly seen in, for example, Sweden.85 In comparison The
US right, as Brandeis has formulated, is more about the idea of right to be left alone.86 The
individual is responsible for his or her conduct; privacy acts as a boundary between the
individuals, and between public and private.87
In the current situation, right to privacy is not only battered by the nation state with the
pretext of security, but also by the commerce collecting more-and-more data. Commerce is
interested in collecting and analyzing data, since it can reveal spending patterns, and be
used for profiling and predicting future behavior of consumer groups. The governmental
interest is different: the interest is in behavior that is against the law or potentially a risk to
security.88 As mentioned, in the US context privacy is especially seen as a right not to be
under the surveillance of the state, which has no right to access your data without having a
legal basis for interfering. As Lessig puts this:
“The traditional question of “privacy” was the limit the law placed upon the
ability of others to penetrate your private space.”89
This Lessigs view is at  par with the traditional approach to privacy as the right to be left
alone. Saarenpää has also advocated this view.90 This is, however, a problematic definition
data might cause discrimination of consumers, see for example, Persis, McLauglin and Levy, 2014, p. 29 -
30.
83Viljanen, 2011, p. 139.
84 Brinhack and Elkin-Koren 2011, p. 341 and Craig  and Lundloff 2011, p. 18 - 19.
85 See Swedish Data Protection Act, Section 1; states the purpose of the act is to protect the personal integrity
– ‘personlig integrihet’.
86Warren and Brandeis, 1890-1891.
87Bennett and Raab, 2006, p. 5 and Warren and Brandeis, 1890-1891 pp. 193, 219 - 220, see also Bygrave,
2002, pp. 129 - 130.
88 Commerce is generally interested about a pattern of consumption that can predict future behavior and help
advertising. See i.e., Lessig, 2006, p. 216.
89Lessig, 2006, p. 201
90Saarenpää 2009a, p. 371.
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for privacy, when we take into account the development of the Internet and technology that
allows easy surveillance as well as profiling and direct marketing. Rule has criticized the
view and stated that technology itself dangers privacy, stating that the actual problem is not
the fact that technology allows us to absorb, analyze, transmit and use personal data. The
fact is that technology is always developed and used by humans. This view of Rule is well
in line with the views of Lessig: the choice between privacy and no privacy can be made
on the level of code and architecture. 91 This is the central idea of privacy by design (PbD).
In practice, this means that privacy can be decided in the development of software and
application. According to Lessig, the protection of privacy is hindered by the fact that there
are no clear interest groups protecting privacy. There is a great amount of regulation to
protect intellectual property, while in comparison privacy is lagging behind.92
The current legal literature seems to see the core of privacy in the right to be left alone, or
personal autonomy. In the personal integrity model, much weight is placed on the
protection of personal autonomy. Raab and Bennett have noted that current protection
privacy protects privacy as an individual right, instead of seeing it as a larger societal
safeguard for democracy.93 The idea of privacy commons does not take privacy as a purely
individual right: this challenges the concepts of autonomy and informed consent.94
Regulation of a commons, with the idea of protecting democracy and privacy as a
collective right of the society, would require different too. In my opinion, it would be good
to view privacy also as a collective right, since it would help balancing the free market and
right to privacy. A great deal of examples could found from environmental legislation.95
This type of regulation would better take the need for balancing the need for using data.
The use of data as a currency is a commonplace practice. The majority of legal scholars
are, however, skeptical about property rights to personal information.96  Additionally, as
Raab and Bennett state, although privacy or personal information may be given value, the
construction of ownership can hardly be constructed in the context of personal data.97 It
would be problematic if personal data would be seen as property, disposable accordingly to
91Rule, 2007, p. 19.
92Lessig 2006, p. 200.
93Bennett and Raab, p. 23.
94For the separate discussion about cyberspace as commons, Lessig, 2002, pp. 19 - 23 and also Lessig, 2006,
p.198.
95Muth has viewed the protection of privacy and compared it to natural resources regulation, Muth 2009, p.
350.
96 Although there are also varying opinions on this issue, see for example Schwartz, 2003-2004, p. 2057.
97Bennett and Raab 2006, p. 10 and Schwartz 2003-2004, pp. 2076.
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the freedoms of contract. Also Saarenpää argues that individuals have the ultimate property
right to the information about them, when we disclose the information – we do not disclose
our property right to the information. I would not go as far with the rebalancing of privacy
and property rights The individual’s right to privacy needs to be protected in future also,
but this could also be done by using a different approach – that would allow more of the
economic activities online. In my opinion, the core of privacy resides in the protection of
democratic institutions and not in the acquisition of consent from individual for each
activity. According to Bygrave, the complexity of the concept of privacy helps balancing
the right to privacy, against other rights.98 The balancing should be done according to the
rules of balancing fundamental rights, in the level of legislation.99
The European Court of Justice has balanced in several decisions the individual’s right to
privacy against other fundamental rights. These cases provide additional input on the
discussion of balancing privacy against property rights. Although by far ECJ has not
resolved cases that would treat especially the economic activities online.100 The trend in the
judgments has been however giving privacy more weight against other fundamental rights.
In  the  two  most  recent  resolutions  on  data  protection,  ECJ  has  strongly  emphasized  the
principle right of privacy and data protection. In the so-called data retention decision101,
ECJ decided that the current data retention directive is unconstitutional. This was because
the limitations on privacy were too high and did not meet the principle of proportionality.
The cases places high emphasis on privacy and safeguards of privacy. The case gave
importance to the proportionality principle and stated that privacy must be taken in account
even when there are security reasons for legislation.
Additionally, in the ECJ Google case, privacy received a high standing.102 ECJ decided
that Google is required to delete search results from the search index. The case is in several
ways a landmark judgment in the area of data protection, since it shows a more activist role
of the ECJ in the field of data protection. The most important part of the ECJ Google case,
in the perspective of secondary use of data, is the decision to interpret the establishment of
a commercial  entity and thus increase the scope of applying the DPD. In the ruling, ECJ
98Bygrave has stated, that it may actually help when balancing different rights for example the freedom of
speech, see Bygrave 2002, p. 127.
99 Viljanen 2011, p. 141 - 144.
100 Cases have been followed until the spring 2014.
101 ECJ Judgment in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others
102Judgment in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
Mario Costeja González
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established that the Spanish DPA had authority over Google, even though Google Inc. is
established in the United States and only had advertising sales in the EU through its
European subsidiary.103
It is important to note that neither of these cases address the issue of balancing the
principle rights behind free markets against privacy, nor balance the free movement of data
against the free movement principles. The property rights aspect has been balanced in the
case In ECJ Case Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU104. The case dealt with the
question of protection of copyrights, and to what extent can privacy be limited in the
context of protecting property rights. Promusicae wanted Telefónica to disclose
information about those individuals who were using KazaA to download music. The
question was about traffic data retained by Telefonica and whether it should for the
protection of copyrights disclose such information to Promusicae. The court decided
against the claims of Promusicae, stating that it is not the purpose of the directives E-
Commerce directive (Directives 2000/31), Copyright directive (2001/29), IPR Rights
Enforcement Directive (2004/48) or Directive on privacy and electronic communication
(2002/58) that operators would be required to disclose traffic data for the protection of
copyrights.105 Although the ECJ Promusicae case could be read in the defense of privacy
versus property rights, I would see the scope of the case much more limited. First of all the
question was about balancing privacy against copyrights protection instead of property
rights in a wider sense. Second of all the disclosure of individuals data for potential
criminal liability cases in a copyrights violation does  more harm to the individual than the
average commercial secondary use of data. In addition to the ECJ case praxis, it is
important to note the European Court of Human Rights decision Germany v Pauefgen,
where the commission has treated the question of what is property, stating clearly that the
protection of property includes also non-tangible assets.106
In my opinion, none of these cases sufficiently balances the free market fundamental rights
and data protection. New ECJ judgments balancing these rights would be useful for
clarifying the balancing of fundamental rights in the area of secondary use of data. In my
opinion, it is clear that some room needs to be left for the data controllers rights’ as well.
103 ECJ C-131/12 Press Release No 70/14, p. 2
104 C‑275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU
105 C‑275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, sections 45 and
70 of the judgment..
106 The case was about the right to domain names, and as such it does not require additional analysis.  See
more, PAEFFGEN GMBH v. Germany.
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Privacy should not become an obstacle for the development of internet commerce. As
stated, the conflict of privacy is itself created by the dual nature of the Data Protection
laws, most notably the DPD; the controllers of data are in a position to both safeguard the
data subject’s rights as well as conducting business. The risk-based approach to privacy
would solve the conflict of fundamental rights much more efficiently.
The following subchapter further analyzes the free movement of data and the current legal
norms on data protection in Europe, including the important definitions of controllers and
processors of personal data. These definitions are explored, so that the parties using data
and the different roles for data processing can be understood. Prior to that, a further
argument for balancing commercial interests and privacy is derived from the European
Union free movement of data principle. The emphasis is on the factors that conflict the
value of data. The norms preventing secondary use of data are also analyzed.
2.2 Free Flow of Personal Data
The European general data protection directive (DPD) been enacted to harmonize data
protection in the common market. The directive especially protects the free flow of data as
well as safeguards data protection and privacy.107 The free flow of data within the common
market is seen as a part of creating an effective, functioning free-trade area.108 These flows
could be seen as a part of the four freedoms, since the data flows may be in some cases
necessary for safeguarding freedom to provide and receive services, especially online
services. Free flow of data is safeguarded within the common market, even if the US
corporate perspective is that in many cases data protection acts as an entry barrier to the
region.109 In my opinion, the free flow of data has such important role in the current online
economy, that it should be considered as the fifth freedom of trade in the EU. The Free
movement of data acts as an important background for the secondary use of data: it shows
that the economic incentive has been behind the data protection directive from the start.
107The free flow of data and privacy can be seen complementary values rather than conflicting values, see e.g.
Bennett and Raab, 2006, p. 95.
108For the freedom to provide services, see Barnard 2007, p. 354.
109 Lee Bygrave summarizes the US based critique of protectionism, and sums the claims to two aspects; data
protection laws cause restrictions to trans-border data flows and increase the scope of such restrictions. See
Bygrave, 2002, p. 114.
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Free movement of data and fundamental rights are safeguarded in the article 1 of the DPD.
Article 1 of the GDPR also protects the free movement of personal data.110
The  DPD  also  contains  the  important  definition  of  personal  data,  which  is  one  of  the
important concepts of this thesis, since the purpose is to analyze the rules that restrict the
commercial secondary use of personal data. The DPD article 3(a):
(a) 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity;
In the era of big data the concept of personal data is problematic, since it big portions of
data fall under this category. This means that any identifiers or potential identifiers can be
seen as personal data, which alone causes problems for the ever-expanding use of data.111
An identifiable natural person is considered a data subject.112 Any kind of data relating to
an individual may be personal data, this includes, for example: address, social security
number and IP-address.  The form of the data is  not important,  it  may be images,  spoken
communications, or in text format.113 When the data controller processes personal data as
part of analytics or profiling the data protection laws apply to the processing.
In addition to personal data, also processing of such data has been defined in the DPD.
Most of the commercial secondary uses can be classified as processing of data, as the
definition in DPD article 2(b) shows;
Processing of data means any operations performed to personal data,
whether the operations are concluded in automatic means or not, including
such activities like collection, recording, organization, storage, use,
alignment or combination, adaptation or alteration and also such activities
like consultation and destruction of data.” –cursivated by the author
The definition includes all activities. It is important in the specific context of this thesis
since the secondary activates fall under the definition. The secondary use of data starts
with the storage of data. Further activities include, for example, combination of data sets
for gaining valuable insights on consumer behavior or preferences, this could be done by
combining data from various sources. According to Kuner the processing should be
understood as it is defined in the directive.114 The definition does not distinguish between
110GDPR, p. 40.
111Ohm claims that the concept of PII or personal data is problematic, since it expands the DPD to many
areas, Ohm 2009-2010, p. 1741.
112Kuner 2007, p. 76 - 77.
113FRA 2013, Handbook on data protection law, p. 42.
114Kuner 2007, p. 74 - 75.
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data processed by automatic measures and not. This means that manual data analytics also
falls under the category of processing.
The secondary user of data is often a data controller; in the abovementioned classification
of this thesis, in two of the situations explored the party conducting the activity is a data
controller. Data controller is the party that collects personal data. Controller is the party
that  controls  and  collects  the  personal  data.  The  term  deriving  from  the  DPD  is  fairly
similarly implemented in the UK Data Protection Act, article 1, Spanish LOPD, article 3
(d) and Finnish Personal Data Act section 3(4).
WP 29 states, that being identified as a controller, is an important first step defining who
has responsibilities for the data.115 The controller carries the responsibilities and has
obligations, especially since articles 10 – 12 of the DPD have been written in a form that
gives obligations to the controller. These articles contain rights for the data subject, and
more precisely: rights to information, access, rectification, erasure and blocking, and the
right to object to the processing of personal data. According to WP 29, this means that the
concept defines who is primarily responsible, and thus the concept of controller allocates
responsibility.116 This definition of being the controller or processor is especially important
in the scenario where a third-party analytics company provides services, which can be
classified as secondary use of data. The party could be defined as the controller of the data
and thus vesting the responsibility of such activities to the external third party.
According to the DPD article 2(e) processor is the party processing the personal data, on
behalf of the controller. The most important consequence of being a controller or processor
is the legal responsibility to comply with the obligations set by data protection law.117 It is
important to note that legal responsibilities might differ in some cases; however, in nearly
every scenario the controller is responsible for the acts of the processor.118 However,
usually it is not easy to define whether a party actually is a controller, especially when the
entities are multinational corporations with complex legal structures and multiple
databases.119
115WP 29, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", p. 4.
116In addition, the concept of controller helps to identify which is the applying national legislation, since the
seat of establishment is of crucial importance when selecting the applicable national law. See also WP 29,
Opinion 1/2010, pp. 4 - 5.
117Handbook on European data protection law, p. 49.
118It must be noted that the processing is usually is done in basis of an agreement that might shift the liability
in form of potential compensations.
119 Kuner 2007, p.70.
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The distinction between controller and processor has also become increasingly blurry;
because of technology allows joint-activities on data. The relationships are also changing
fast. This is, according to Kuner, problematic, since in many scenarios the controller is
responsible for many actions, such as giving notices and complying with the legislation.120
My view is that this will not become easier in future, as varying data activities, such as
profiling, analytics, outsourcing and sale of data and transfers will further blur these roles.
The proposed European Regulation will not solve the conflict; in fact, the definitions will
remain nearly unchanged.121
The following subchapter will open the concept of secondary use of data, which is derived
from the purpose limitation. The subchapter will also provide three example scenarios of
secondary use of data.
2.3 Secondary Use of Data
In the European context, secondary use of data is the use of data for other purposes than
the ones specified when the data was collected. The secondary use of data is not specified
in the DPD or in national law.122 Under the DPD other uses than the initial use for a certain
purpose are restricted by article 6 or purpose specification and consent article 7(a). The
new Proposal for General Regulation does not provide answers to such secondary use,
which would be needed for the big data context.123 In the big data context, it is important
that data can be used for other purposes than the one specified, and according to Mayer-
Schönberger often the value of big data derives from the combination of different data
sets.124 Prima facie, the DPD acts in a preventive way against secondary use of data.125
The commercial secondary use of data is another concept used in this thesis. It encloses all
the commercial activities that might be done with personal data collected. With the term
120 Kuner 2007, pp. 72 - 73.
121 GDPR, p. 41, article 2.
122In the US context, secondary use of data can be viewed as the uses of data in which the data subject has not
consented to. See for example Daniel J. Solove, 2008, 131. Also see, for example, WP 29 for the repurposing
of data use, Opinion 03/2013, pp.  20 - 21. WP 29 has used the term ‘further’ processing instead of secondary
use of data.
123This is especially problematic since there are also beneficial effects for the consumers in the secondary use
of data, these can for example fall of prices also the secondary market for data can create positive
externalities to consumers. These externalities include for example convenient use of multiple services or
relevant information about products, Acquisti 2009, p. 10 - 11.
124Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, pp. 106 - 107.
125Solove has stated the US view on limitations of secondary use of data is much ‘less comprehensive’ than
the European equivalent see Solove, 2008, p. 133.
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commercial, for example, research and medical research are excluded from the definition.
Activities included are, for example, profiling, behavioral analytics and marketing, and
customer feedback and personalization of services. Also combination of data archives
would fall under this category. Predictive analytics would most likely also fall under this
category. In the modern day internet economy, multiple data-based economic activities can
be seen as secondary uses of data. The ICO has listed several activities that are big data
analytics that would involve the use of personal data; these include location data, purchases
data and loyalty card data. In addition the ICO also notes that due big data there is the
possibility for the creation of new data.126
The possible secondary uses of data in the scope of my research question can be classified
into three categories. Classification is based on the different data controllers or processors
involved in the secondary use of the data. The first example is internal secondary use of
data, in which data collected is used internally for purposes other than originally specified.
This could be i.e. analytics or internal marketing operations with the data. For example, the
data controller could collect data for providing products to customers or to survey their
satisfaction, secondary use of the data could be analytics of customer behavior, which
could then be used for targeted marketing.
The second category is a so-called controller-to-controller, secondary use, in which the
data is transferred from the initial controller to another, who then controls the data and
conducts operations on it. An example would be the sale of data from a car retailer to the
factory that builds the cars. In this question, the risks are in the transfer of the data and in
the internal data processing of the manufacturer. The question is of joint controllership of
the data, which has been analyzed in the previous chapter. In case of international data
transfer the rules for international data transfer would apply, most notably the national
implementations of the articles 25 and 26 on international data transfers. Kuner has
analyzed data transfers.127 In the scope of the European single market, the data transfers
can be done freely, since the EU acts as a single market in relation to data as well.128
In the third category, data is processed on behalf of the original controller, by a
subcontractor, who, for example, offers marketing or data-analytics services. In this
126 ICO 2014, Big data and data protection, p. 11.
127For the scope of this thesis the data transfers cannot be treated, a short introduction would not cover the
complexity of this topic and a loner one would not fit the scope of a master’s thesis. See more in Kuner, 2013
128It should however be taken to account that the purpose restriction and legality of data processing has to be
fulfilled in the context of data transfers as well.
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question, the risks are same as in the previous ones, however, taking into account that the
subcontractor is acting with a mandate given by the controller, and the need for relevant
contractual clauses in place.
 The following picture 2.1 shows three different scenarios of secondary data usage:
1. Internal secondary use of data 2. Data transfer and secondary use
Agreement
3. Analytics of retail data by external analytics company
The purpose restriction and minimality apply to all of these scenarios. Also Prima facie, it
seems that the GDPR does not either solve the problems in connection with the secondary
use of data. The approach remains overall as it was previously; the definitions of personal
data, data controller and processor all remain same.129 A special emphasis is given to those
principles entwined with the problems caused by the value of data, big data and
anonymization, especially the purpose restriction.
2.4 Purpose Limitation and Minimality
The big data use of personal data needs to be compliant with the principles of data
protection laws, which implement the DPD in the Member States. Most important
129GDPR, p.41 - 42.
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principles in connection with my research question are: legitimacy of data collection,
minimality and purpose limitation or specification, all of these principles are in a
problematic and challenged by the technologic development.130 Data minimality and
purpose limitation are analyzed in this subchapter, fairness and lawfulness of data
collection is analyzed in the next subchapter. Other principles include, for example, the
accuracy of data, security of the data, informing the person concerned and the
accountability of the data processor.131 These principles are important as they affect the
data controller and give rights to the data subject. Because the scope of this thesis, I will
not open these principles more, since they not provide answers on the secondary use of
data.132
The principles of the DPD are pan-European, but the national implementations of these
principles might slightly differ. As also, Bygrave states, the member state implementations
vary.133 This further complicates the aforementioned conflict between value of data and the
purpose specification; since data collection for marketing and profiling purposes can easily
be cross-border and the purpose limitation may be differently interpreted in different
European jurisdictions.134 The following analysis is done based on the DPD principles, and
national implementations will be viewed as examples of the implementation. These
principles need to be accounted when planning activities that fall under the scope of the
data protection directive “automatic processing of personal data” (or its national
implementations), such as the secondary use of data. The goal of the core principles is to
safeguard personal autonomy of the data subjects and privacy.135
The big data use of personal data could be conducted compliant to the DPD if the purpose
of collection could be stated in a vague enough way, stating that data is collected for all
purposes and for unlimited time and at the same time ensuring that the processing of data is
legitimate.  However,  this would go strongly against  the fundamental  right to privacy and
130Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, p. 155.
131Bygrave, 2002, p. 2.
132In many cases, the information security is an important condition that the commerce needs to fulfil if they
do not want to suffer high PR-damages, Innocenzio, 2014.
133Bygrave, 2002, p. 61.
134My view is that, since there is a proposal for harmonizing the data protection across EU, it is not important
to venture more in the differences – the more important part is the analysis of the elements that will remain
same even if the proposed GDPR will pass into force.
135It should be noted that in the area of data protection principles data protection law comes close to
administrative law. The principles govern the data processors activities, much in the same ways as the
principles for good governance. Bygrave 2002, p. 167.
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against the whole notion of purpose limitation.136 The purpose limitation is in its place to
protect the consumers from unexpected data uses and also against aimless collection of big
amounts of data, for the reason of potential future processing. The goal is also preventing
the data creep or function creep, which means the expansion of data uses or blurring of the
purpose restriction.137 However,  for the business it  is  seldom possible to define all  of the
possible purposes for the collection of data prior the collection of data. This arises the
following questions; can there be multiple purposes, how vague can the purpose be and is
the repurposing of data possible. Repurposing means that the purpose is changed from the
original purpose.138
Purpose limitation answers the question of why data is collected and how is the data used,
and  for  what  purposes.  It  also  sheds  light  to  the  types  of  data  collected  as  well  as  the
retention times of the data and processing operations.139 The purpose limitation extends the
whole lifecycle of data use, starting from pre-collection and extending to the disclosure and
secondary use of data. The principle is strongly entwined with concepts of notice and
consent.140 Purpose specification means that personal data shall be collected for specified
and lawful purposes, and it shall be processed within the purpose of collection.141 If data is
used for other purposes than the specified ones, it causes the data processing to be
unlawful.142 This means, for example, that if data were collected for delivering items from
e-commerce, the data should not be for marketing, if the data subject has not been aware of
that purpose. This is problematic since, there is a commercial incentive to use the primary
data for secondary purposes and even sell the data.143 The principle of purpose
specification derives from the article 6(1)(b) of the DPD:
Article 6.
---
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of
data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as
incompatible if Member States provide appropriate safeguards.
136In addition, it has been stated that the purpose defined cannot be defined in such vague way.
137Brouwer 2011, p. 274 and 277.
138ICO 2014, Big data and data protection, p. 9.
139WP 29 Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, pp. 11 - 12.
140 Notice  is  given  to  show  the  purpose  to  the  data  user.  In  the  Finnish  context  for  the  planning  of  data
processing, see Innanen and Saarimäki 2009, pp. 91 - 92. See also Finnish DPA, Tietosuojavaltuutetun pohja
tietosuojaselosteen laatimiseksi.
141Bygrave 2002 p. 61.
142WP 29 Opinion 03/2011, p. 36.
143Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013, pp. 104 - 106.
30
The article 6 means that data should be collected and used only for the purpose specified to
the data subject.144 The purpose specification can be separated into three different sub-
criterions: firstly, the purpose needs to be specific, secondly explicit and thirdly
legitimate.145 The first criterion means that the data needs to be collected for a specific
purpose, and unnecessary data should not be collected. The second criterion means that not
only the data controller should know the purpose, but also it needs to be clearly expressed
in a clearly understandable format to the data subject, authorities and third parties. The
third  criterion  of  legitimacy  is  connected  with  article  7  of  the  DPD,  which  contains  the
legitimate basis for data processing. WP 29 extends the requirement stating that the
purpose needs to be in accordance with all data protection laws in every scenario and phase
of the data collection and use.146 In  fact,  according  to  WP  29  articles  6  and  7  are
cumulative, both criterions have to be met simultaneously – it is not enough that secondary
use is legitimate; it has to be also done accordingly with the predefined purpose.147
The Finnish Data Protection Act implements the purpose restriction in section 6 and the
exclusivity of the purpose in section 7. Defining the purpose for data processing should be
done prior to collecting the data:
Section 6 Defined purpose of processing
It must be appropriate and justified to process personal data in the operations
of the controller. The purpose of the processing of personal data, the regular
sources of personal data and the regular recipients of recorded personal data
shall be defined before the collection of the personal data intended to be
recorded in the file or their organisation into a personal data file. The
purpose of the processing shall be defined so that those operations of the
controller in which the personal data are being processed are made clear.
The exclusivity of purpose restriction is the most problematic part of the purpose
restriction. This is defined in the section 7 of the Personal Data Act:
Section 7 — Exclusivity of purpose
Personal data must not be used or otherwise processed in a manner
incompatible with the purposes referred to in section 6. Later processing for
purposes of historical, scientific or statistical research is not deemed
incompatible with the original purposes.
The  Spanish  article  4  of  LOPD  and  Schedule  1  of  the  UK  Data  Protection  Act  contain
similar  purpose  restrictions.  The  proposed  GDPR  article  5  also  contains  the  principle
144This also fulfils the controller’s duty to inform the data subjects.
145Brouwer interestingly distinguishes the purpose restriction differently: to five different aspects. See more,
Brouwer 2011, p. 277 and Bygrave 2002, p. 338.
146Bygrave 2002, pp. 338 – 339 and WP Opinion 03/2013, pp. 15- 16 and 19 - 20.
147Working Party 29, 2013Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, 36.
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purpose restriction.148 There are exemptions to the purpose restriction for statistic and
research purposes. Quite clearly, these exemptions permit the use of data for secondary
purposes in specific scenarios; this may be extremely useful in the field of medical
research, for example.149
Secondary uses (such as analytics or combining data) can be included in the purpose.  The
interesting question is whether such methods can be used on legacy data, meaning that the
data has been collected prior such techniques for analytics existed. The vagueness of
purpose, is an element of the purpose restriction the WP 29 has in fact stated in its opinion
that it is possible to collect and process data for multiple purposes, they should, however,
be specified. In addition, it is avoidable to have a broad purpose just to justify possible data
uses that are not related to the core purpose.150 This option to collect data for multiple
purposes does to some extent ease the pressure caused by purpose restriction. It is,
however, impossible to state and include all the possible uses of data and especially in the
case of legacy data, the analytics and other secondary uses are not usually included in the
purpose defined. WP 29 has also proposed changes to the current language of the DPD; the
changes would further clarify the secondary use of data.151 These factors hinder the
secondary use of data.
However according to WP 29, purpose limitation is a crucial building block for privacy
and the potential future uses can be included in data-collection phase.152 The WP 29 argues
that purpose specification is not in conflict with the recent development of the information
economy. The working party states that purpose specification is a balanced approach and
the problem is the disharmonized approach in the member states.153 The opinion of WP 29
shows the problematic nature of the purpose specification: a vague purpose would best
serve the commercial interest, but this cannot be accepted from the perspective of data
protection. Especially the future processing and use of data is hard to include in the
purpose and this conflicts with the economic value of information, as it is often impossible
to know possible future uses of data. According to Mayer-Schönberger, purpose
specification is a principle challenged especially because often the value of data is in the
148GDPR, p.43.
149For the scope of the research question, it is impossible to deeper venture to this topic of statistical,
historical or scientific exemption to the purpose restriction. For more information on statistical research, see
Duncan, Elliot and Salazar, 2011.
150WP 29 Opinion 03/2013, p. 16.
151WP 29, Opinion 03/2013, pp. 41 - 43.
152WP 29, Opinion 03/2013, p.3.
153WP 29, Opinion 03/2013, pp. 4 -5.
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secondary, rather than in the primary use.154 In  the  light  of  the  WP  29  opinion  on
repurposing of data use Mayer-Schönbergers claim might in fact be a slight overstate. WP
29 and ICO have stated that that the future changes to the purposes to the processing do not
need to be completely compatible with the initial purpose as long as they are not
incompatible with the purpose, this gives some flexibility to the controller for changing the
activities conducted with the data.155 According to ICO the repurposing of data use can be
done, if the new use is not unreasonable considering the expectations of the data subject.156
WP 29 has also given out specific guidance for repurposing, which is especially crucial for
the secondary use of data, in cases where the secondary use would be done on legacy data.
I see that WP 29 has found a good balance to the principle of purpose restriction and their
suggestion for the modification of the purpose restriction would serve as a good hotfix for
data use in the era of big data. In my opinion, the purpose restriction has an important role
in the future of data protection since; in all the vagueness, the principle also has
flexibility.157
In addition to the purpose restriction, data minimality set in the article 6(1)c also greatly
affects the commercial secondary use of data. The principle affects the quantity of data
collected and the retention times.158 The data minimization of the DPD can be interpreted
so that the processing of personal data must be restricted to the necessary minimum to
achieve the purpose.159 Especially the temporary effect  is  important in the context of big
data, where there would be an incentive for collecting data as long as possible. The other
aspect of data minimization deals with the act of collecting and storing the data, which
should be conducted in as minimalistic form as possible. This can also be interpreted to
mean the infrastructure for processing as Kuner has pointed out.160 In its guidance, CNIL
has given an important role to the principle of data minimality, stating that it is one of the
important prerequisites for data processing.161 In the Finnish context, Data Protection Act
Section 9(1) contains the limitation for collecting other data than needed. Vanto has
analyzed this and stated that data other than the defined data needed does not need to be
collected. The data minimality affects the data retention times, since according to this
154Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013, pp. 151 - 152.
155ICO 2014, Big data and data protection, p. 22 and WP 29 Opinion 03/2013, p. 21.
156ICO 2014, Big data and data protection , p. 22.
157Although this flexibility can be lost if the purpose restriction is applied too strictly, as for example
Brouwer would suggests, Brouwer 2011, p. 274.
158 Bygrave 2002, pp. 59 - 60 and ICO 2014, Big data and data protection, p.23.
159Kuner, 2007, p. 74.
160WP29 1999, Protection of Individuals and Kuner 2007, p. 74.
161CNIL 2012b. pp. 5 - 7.
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principle data should not be retained after the possible use for data is fulfilled. For
example, if phone numbers or addresses and other personal data were collected for an e-
commerce for shipping, and disclosed to a courier service, the courier service should not
retain the data after the service has been carried out.162 Data minimality greatly safeguards
the fundamental rights of the data subject; it lessens the risk that data would be used
against the fundamental rights. The big data context however creates the need for storing
data for a long time, since as stated; the value of data can be often discovered after a long
time. For example, the courier company could use the data for analyzing routes and
increasing efficiency. According to ICO anonymization may act as a solution for retaining
personal data for longer periods and not violating the data minimality principle.163
There are however certain problems with the purpose restriction and data minimality
principle which, restrict the uses of data. Some restrictions of data use are needed for
safeguarding the fundamental  right to privacy. The problem is however that more data is
needed for analytics and almost anything can act as an identifier, this creates a scenario
where a whole database needs to be processed accordingly to the limitations set by the data
protection laws even though there not so many identifiers in the database.
The next element analyzed, is the legitimacy of processing data, and what is the required
basis for such data processing. The legitimacy of data use is located in the center of the
conflicting rights of privacy and freedom to conduct business. Consent representing the
ultimate autonomy and legitimate interest being a balancing test for the data controllers’
interests and individuals rights. The requirement that data processing should be legitimate
is  well  in  line  with  the  purpose  restriction  as  well  as  a  data  protection  principle.  The
analyzed article is especially DPD 7, which is left untouched in the proposed GDPR. The
recent  WP 29  opinion  further  clarified  the  wording  of  purpose  restriction  also  proposing
the removal of unclear wording, which would more clearly lead to the interpretation that
both article 7 and article 6 need to be fulfilled cumulatively by the data controller so that
the data processing is legitimate.
162 Vanto, 2011, p. 53.
163ICO 2014, Big data and data protection, p. 24.
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2.5 Legitimate Commercial Secondary Use of Data
Since secondary use of data is data processing, it must meet the legal basis for data
processing. The DPD states that personal data may only processed when there is a legal
basis for processing the data. The different bases are listed in the article 7 of the DPD. The
two bases for data processing analyzed in this thesis are consent and legitimate interest for
processing; both of these bases have their benefits. From a fundamental rights perspective,
consent best ensures the personal autonomy of the data subjects.164 From the viewpoint of
a  data  processor,  consent  is,  however,  a  burdensome  way  to  gain  compliance  with  the
relevant data protection laws. This chapter concentrates on the article 7(a) (consent) and on
the  article  7(f)  (legitimate interest).165 Other legitimate basis for data processing include,
for example, that processing is based on contract, vital interests of data subject or in public
interest and the processing is done by an official authority.166
Consent has been defined in the DPD. Consent is one of the bases that acts as a general
ground for the legitimacy of data processing, as well as a special ground in several cases,
most notably article 8 cases where processed data is considered as sensitive.167  The DPD
article 3 defines consent and sets the conditions for valid consent:
“(h) 'the data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific and
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.” (Curs. by the
author)
The most important aspect of consent in the context of commercial secondary data use is
the scope of given consent.  How explicit  must the consent be so that it  allows the use of
data subject’s data in different areas? Another important question is the temporal-effect of
consent: when does the individual need to give his or her consent for the activities?
WP 29 has defined consent more in their clarifying opinion on consent about the four valid
aspects of consent; it needs to be a clear and unambiguous indication of wishes, freely
given, specific and informed.168 WP 29 has further clarified the requirements of consent:
“There is in principle no limits as to the form consent can take. However, for
consent to be valid, in accordance with the Directive, it should be an
164Saarenpää 2009a, pp. 410 - 411.
165 It must be noted that the previous discussion of the concept of controller applies also to this requirement
7(f) see e.g. WP 29, Opinion 1/2010, p. 5.
166 Innanen and Saarimäki 2009, pp. 89 - 90 and Vanto 2011, pp. 46 - 47.
167Sensitive data will not be treated as part of this thesis since it falls out of the scope of this research.
168WP 29, Working Document 114, p. 67.
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indication. Even if it can be "any" form of indication, it should be clear what
exactly can fall within the definition of an indication.”169
However,  it  should  be   taken  into  account  that  according  to  WP  29,  passivity  cannot  be
seen as an indication. The European Commission has adopted a similar view, stating in the
recital 25 of the proposal regulation that passivity cannot be accepted as an indication.170
The requirement for a freely given and informed consent varies across jurisdictions.
Especially in the case of online services, the requirements for consent may be different; in
some jurisdictions, opt-in is required. In practice, in many Internet services the consent is
given by ticking a box. In other jurisdiction passivity, such as using a service can be seen
as consent.
Consent and purpose restriction have a problematic relationship in the environment of
secondary commercial data use. The data subject consents only for the specified
purpose.171 This creates a strong interconnection between the purpose restriction and
consent. The data subject needs to be informed well of the purpose of data processing.
However, this might be problematic in the big data context, where there is an interest of
changing the purpose later on, or defining the purpose in a vague manner. The data subject
cannot consent to activities that are not clear, since this would not fulfill the requirement of
informed consent and thus the personal autonomy and control aspect of consent. The
individual has a clear interest of knowing, so that they may have control over the activities.
Another problematic area of consent is the temporality of consent. The temporal effect of
consent requires that it must be acquired prior to processing.172 In addition, if the
individual informs the processor later on that they do not want their data processed, the
processing must cease, since losing the consent would mean losing the legal basis for
processing. The GDPR article 7 would further clarify this by stating that the individual
may  in  any  time  withdraw  their  consent  and  that  this  does  not  affect  the  legality  of  the
processing done prior the withdrawal of the consent.173
Consent is also a notion in contract law, in this area it is especially analyzed from the
perspective of validity. WP 29 has clarified the relationship between civil law consent and
DPD stating that the directive does not address the conditions of validity of consent from
169WP 29 Opinion 15/2011, p. 11.
170WP 29, Opinion 15/2011, p. 12 and GDPR, p. 21.
171Kuner, 2007, p. 68. For the Finnish context on consent see, Vanto 2011, p. 44 - 45 and HE 96/1998, p. 38 -
39.
172WP 29, Opinion 15/2011, p. 31.
173In addition, the article 19 of the GDPR contains the right to object to the processing of data. In my opinion,
this will in the future create additional problems in the area of big data processing, GDPR, p. 45 and 56.
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the perspective of civil law. There is an overlap, which means that also the conditions of
civil law apply.174 This interconnection with contract law should be taken into account.
Although consent is valid from the perspective of the DPD it might still be invalid if it can
be shown to be invalid from the perspective of contract law. This could be for example due
to lacking competence, which can be caused by the fact that the data subject has been a
minor or lacking the mental capacity for making a valid agreement. In this area, there is a
strong interconnection between data protection and consumer protection.
This way of justifying data processing is extremely problematic in the era of big data for
two reasons: it is not effective, and it does not give real autonomy to the subject, as it
might  be  hard  not  to  consent  for  the  use  of  everyday  services  that  need  your  data.175 It
could be even claimed that consent does not work for any of the parties included in the
transaction.176 For  active  purpose  limitation  the  consumers  would  need  to  know  of  the
purposes the consent is not valid if you do not know what you are consenting to. Even so
the importance of consent is amplified by the fact that consent legitimizes nearly all uses of
data.177 The basis is the consent of the data subjects, legitimizing any kind of data use, this
is however problematic. In many cases, consent is given without much consideration. For
example behavioral economic studies indicate that people are not equipped to deal with the
tradeoff of short-term gains and long-term loss of privacy.178 As an economic argument to
the issue of consent, Posner, has stated, that since the costs of disclosure of information to
individuals are small, but since the costs of obtaining consent from the individuals for the
secondary use of the information are high, such consent shouldn’t be necessary to
obtain.179 Also already in the area of data transfers, the WP 29 has noted, that in many
cases, it may be burdensome to rely on consent when carrying out regular data transfers
and thus saying that consent may be a false good solution.180
We must take into account, the two major problems with consent; the temporal effect, and
how to get explicit consent for activities that might not be clear. The most applicable
solution would prima facie seem be  the  DPDs article  7(f),  which  is  often  referred  as  the
legitimate interest ground for data processing, or as connection requirement in the Section
174WP 29, Opinion 15/2011, p. 6.
175Rule has stated, the we cannot really say no for most to the services that as a requirement for use need our
consent and approval, for example opting out for the use of credit card or bank account. Rule 2007, p. 170.
176 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013, pp. 154 - 155, 173.
177Solove 2012-2013, p. 1880.
178 Acquisti, 2010, p. 6.
179Posner 1977-1978 p. 398.
180WP 29, 2005, Working Document 114, p. 11.
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8(5) of the Finnish Personal Data Act.181 In cases where the data controller has a legitimate
interest, they might process the data. By using the article 7(f) and conducting the balancing
test correctly, with additional safeguards (such as anonymization for example), data
processor may be able to conduct commercial secondary use of data, requiring that the
purpose restriction of article 6 is fulfilled. The WP 29 has recently published a guideline on
the article 7(f), firstly correcting the popular misconception that 7(f) would act as a last
resort – instead it is stated that the article has its own specific uses and that it should be
treated as an equally good ground for data processing.182As stated by WP 29, it is better to
use article 7(f) as grounds for processing instead of misusing other legal grounds:
“Appropriate use of Article 7(f), in the right circumstances and subject to
adequate safeguards, may also help prevent misuse and over-reliance on
other legal grounds”183
The article 7(f) acts as a balancing test that takes into account the legitimacy of the interest
of the data controller, and balances it against the fundamental rights of the data subject.184
The balancing is done on a case-by-case basis, since the article would otherwise have a
very broad scope of application.185 Prior to conducting the balancing test, it must be
explored what could be considered as a legitimate interest of the processor in the
commercial secondary use context. In addition, the rights of the data subject need to be
balanced. First, the interests of the processor need to be clearly defined. For example, WP
29 has listed economic benefit of the processing one of such interests; a company has, for
example, the economic interest of knowing the customers as well as possible.186 The
balancing  test  may offer  some relief  to  the  data  controller  wishing  to  conduct  secondary
activities.
WP 29 has stated that the interest of controller is legitimate as long as the controller may
pursue their interest in accordance with the data protection and other applicable laws, such
as consumer protection laws. According to WP 29, online and offline marketing activities
can be seen as legitimate, as long as appropriate safeguards for the consumers are in place.
181Interestingly in the Finnish law this has been translated as connection requirement ”asiallinen yhteys”
which could be understood differently as the legitimate interests. It could in this way question whether the
Finnish law fulfils the DPD in this area. This area is originally from the previous law in force. More on the
scope of this requirement see, for example, Vanto 2011 pp. 47 - 48 and HE 96/1998, p. 40.
182WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, p. 10.
183WP 29Opinion 06/2014, p. 9.
184This balancing test resonates well with the fundamental rights super-question, which is the big picture
conflict of the interests in this thesis. See more in the previous chapters 1.1 and 2.1.
185WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, p. 22.
186Other interests would include for example societal benefits of the processing, but I am doubtful of such
benefits in the area of commercial secondary use of data, WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, p.  24.
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WP 29 has stated that this does not mean that the controller could combine under this basis
a vast amount of data collected in different contexts under different purposes, and create
extensive profiles of consumers, and for example, sell these profiles. This would,
according to WP 29, likely act as a significant intrusion into the privacy of the data
subjects, and thus be unjustified and weight the balancing against the interests of the data
controller.187 Prima facie, the WP 29 opinion could be read to allow certain minor
commercial secondary activities on data. However, activities that are not transparent and
do not contain the possible safeguards are not allowed, and cannot be constituted to
balance the scale in favor of the data controller. For example, profiling that leads to price
discrimination, without the necessary transparency and right to object, is not allowed. The
balancing will be done based on the interest of the data controller, against the fundamental
rights or interests of the data subject. The balancing test is done by assessing four aspects,
as stated by WP 29. The aspects are first of all controllers’ legitimate interest, impact on
data subjects, provisional balance and additional safeguards.188 I will now analyze the
criterion set by WP 29, in the light of commercial secondary use of data.
The data controller’s right to conduct business and the right to property is the right in the
other side of the balancing test. It safeguards the data controllers’ right to conduct online
business and use data processing as part of the economic activities conducted. According
to WP 29, data processing needs to be necessary and proportionate.189 At  the  side  of  the
individual, the protected right is the right to privacy, and more specifically the nature of the
personal data processed, as well as expectations of the data subject. For example, in the
scope of secondary use of data for profiling, the negative emotional effects of such
profiling need to be taken into account.190 How can the controller then take the balancing
test and what are the important steps. According to WP 29 first, the interest of the
controller needs to be real and the purpose needs to be legitimate. The effects on the data
subject need to be considered and additionally the method of processing needs to be
assessed. The important question is, whether the goals can be reached in other ways that
are less intrusive to the data subject. The activities should be conducted in a way that
affects the rights of the data subject as few as possible. The whole balancing process needs
to be documented; the data controller must be able to demonstrate that they have in fact
187WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, pp. 25 - 26.
188WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, pp. 31 - 33.
189WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, p. 34.
190WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, p .36.
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made the balancing of rights and considered alternatives. In addition, the result of such
balancing test should never be completely against the reasonable expectations of the data
subject.191 Anonymization  is  listed  as  one  of  the  additional  safeguards  that  may  tip  the
scale – meaning that if data may be anonymized it widens the application of the article
7(f), more activities may thus be conducted with data that can be anonymized.192
Summarizing the issue of applying article 7(f) as the basis for commercial secondary use of
data,  I  would like to address four points.  First,  the WP 29 guidance is still  unclear in the
whole array of data activities; there is a need for more case examples in the area. Second, it
would seem that minor secondary use of data might be conducted in accordance with the
article; major operations would not likely pass the balancing test. Thirdly, with the proper
use of anonymization the scope of these commercial operations can be widened. Fourthly,
in many instances WP 29 has highlighted the importance of considering the purpose
restriction when using article 7(f) as a basis for data processing. Purpose restriction acts in
an even stricter manner when combined with the said basis of legitimate interest. This may
completely shut the commercial data activities, if they are not clearly defined prior to
collection of data.
In the GDPR, the secondary use of data is further made harder, since the legitimate interest
ground does not apply in a similar way. In fact, according to article 6(4), the further
processing of personal data cannot be based on the legitimate interest.193 As personal data
legislation can be burdensome from an economic and administrative perspective, and there
is no certainty that the new regulation will  solve the problems and allow the agile use of
personal data as part of data sets, alternate solutions have to be searched.
Following the article 7(f) balancing test and purpose restriction the potential area of
secondary activities remains minor. Anonymization might act as a solution to allow more
data uses. Anonymization has been already used widely connection with the statistical and
research. In the case of research the values against each other is the development of science
and privacy. Article 13 of the DPD sets the exemptions for the use of data in research. The
next chapter will focus on anonymization in general, and especially on anonymization as a
commercial practice as part of commercial data processing. A mainly legal dogmatic
approach is adapted; additionally computer science will in this case provide the some input
191WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, pp. 39 - 40 and 54 - 55.
192WP 29 Opinion 06/2014, p. 42.
193GDPR, p. 43 - 44.
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as consequentialist arguments. Certain points should be taken into account in relation to
anonymization and this chapter. Anonymization is considered as processing of personal
data, and it needs thus to fulfill the requirement of legality as well as fit into the purpose
restriction. This creates an interesting situation where anonymization can be used as a
safeguard, which acts as a scale in the balancing test of article 7(f), while at the same time
a similar balancing test would be needed for legitimizing the process of anonymizing
data.194 In my thesis, the role of anonmyization is important, since it currently helps
strongly  to  solve  the  conflicting  fundamental  rights  of  secondary  use  of  data.  For  this
reasons it is important to analyze the legal background for anonymization and the current
problems with de-identification and valuation of data. Anonymization also protects the
individual’s privacy, allowing more data use, without putting the data subject at risk.
3 Anonymizing Data Allows Commercial Secondary Use
3.1 Anonymization as a Privacy Enhancing Technology
Simply put, anonymization is the process of rendering data containing personal
information into a form in which it does not identify individuals, but in which the data is
still usable.195Prima facie, it  could  be  stated  that  anonymization  solves  most  of  the
problems in connection with secondary use of data.196 The commercial use of data could be
based  on  the  DPD  article  7(f)  and  strong  anonymization.  Anonymized  data  is  also  not
considered  as  personal  data  and  the  restrictions  of  DPD  do  not  thus  apply,  if  the
anonymization is conducted in a strong enough manner. However, the technological
development  is  a  two-edged  sword,  at  the  same time it  raises  the  value  of  data  and  thus
grows the need for advantaged data processing operations, as well as heightens the risk of
anonymization being broken by advanced technologies. As the UKAN states,
anonymization is valuable since it allows data to be shared, without endangering
privacy.197 Anonymization is defined as the process of removing, obscuring, aggregating
194WP 29 Opinion 05/2014, p. 7 - 8.
195ICO, 2012 Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, p. 48.
196Especially Ohm criticizes this view stating that anonymization has let the legislators from answering to
different conflicting interests of security, innovation and free flow of information. Ohm, 2009-2010, p. 1736.
197Sedayao  2012,  p.  2.  As  stated  in  a  practical  sense  anonymization  allows  the  use  of  data  in  a  way  that
privacy is not challenged. This is off course an over simplification of the issue. UKAN states a similar goal in
their homepage – the goal is to maximize value of data and minimize risks to privacy, UK Anonymization
Network.
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and/or altering the identifiers that establish the data as personally identifiable or simply put
as a process of making it impossible to identify data subjects.198
Recital 26 of the DPD indicates that anonymization is a possible from of protection of
privacy, and that a code of conduct by national authorities may be established.199
According to the DPD, Recital 26:
“(26) Whereas the principles of protection must apply to any information
concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to determine
whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means
likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to
identify the said person; whereas the principles of protection shall not apply
to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer
identifiable; whereas codes of conduct within the meaning of Article 27 may
be a useful instrument for providing guidance as to the ways in which data
may be rendered anonymous and retained in a form in which identification
of the data subject is no longer possible;”
The article 27 of the DPD gives guidance for drafting code of conducts,  such as the ICO
code of conduct on anonymization. The United Kingdom’s DPAs code of practice is the
first soft law legal instrument affecting anonymization comprehensively. 200 The new
General Regulation has also taken a similar approach. Anonymous data is seen as out of
the scope of personal data.201
Anonymization has also been treated in the e-Privacy directive (Directive 2002/58/EC),
which treats questions regarding electronic communications. In this directive,
anonymization is mentioned in two articles, 6(1) ‘traffic data’ and 9(1) ‘location data’, as
well as in the Recital 26, where it is stated that traffic Data used for marketing should be
rendered anonymous. It is important to consider these instances if the anonymization
process falls under the scope of the e-Privacy directive.202
Anonymization models and techniques fall under the category of the so-called PETs
(privacy enhancing technologies).203 Privacy enhancing technologies are technologies,
which by implementation protect privacy. According to Acquisti, PETs can protect privacy
in  a  cost-efficient  way,  which  still  allowing  the  exploitation  and  use  of  data.204
198Duncan, Elliot and Salazar, p.  171 and Key Information, UK Anonymization Network.
199 ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, p. 10.
200 In addition, the CNIL guidance mentions anonymization as one of the methods reducing risks in
connection with personal data, CNIL  2012a, p. 24.
201 GDPR, p. 21.
202 For the purpose of this thesis it is however possible to further analyze the e-Privacy directives approach to
anonymization. Although the directive affects many activities conducted especially in the space of operators,
it is not in the center of the emphasis on commercial secondary use of data.
203ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, p.7.
204Acquisti, 2010, p. 6.
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Anonymization or de-identification is recommended as one of the default activities by the
Privacy by Design-movement.205 It should be noted that encryption is a different activity,
although it is also a PET. They key difference is that anonymized data is still useful for a
certain purpose, for example, medical research, statistical research, or even marketing,
analytics and data sales purposes. Encrypting data, on the other hand, is a process in which
data is rendered unreadable, so that it can be decrypted with the correct access code.206 The
definition of truly anonymized data is that it cannot be returned into its previous form,
which contains personal identifiers.207 This is not true with encryption, where it is actually
in important to be able to return data into an unencrypted form.
As I have previously stated, the data protection laws apply on personal data as defined in
the 3.1 article of the DPD. If data is anonymized, data is not considered personal data and
it is considered to be outside the restrictions of the previous chapter. Finnish Personal Data
Act does not define anonymous and pseudonymous data.208 In comparison to anonymized
data, pseudonymous data is data where unique identifiers are replaced with a symbol,
string of numbers or a letter, for instance, a name is replaced with a connectable
pseudonym. Pesoudonymized data and anonymized data have an important difference:
pseoudonymized data is still covered under the data protection laws, unlike anonymized
data.209The concept of pseoudonymized data is also included in the current proposal from
the European Commission. According to WP 29, pseyudonymization can still also be a
valuable safeguard for the data. Since it lessens the possibility that the data is linked to the
data subject, it should not, however, be considered as a method of anonymization.210
WP 29 has recently published a complete analysis on anonymization and different
techniques  of  analysis.  In  the  opinion,  WP  29  analyzes  the  risks  and  requirements  of
anonymization, further clarifying the use of anonymization techniques in the context of
DPD. In the opinion, anonymization techniques have been classified into two families; first
of the families or approaches is randomization, second is generalization.211 Randomization
means adding elements to the data set, thus reducing the risk of identification; it includes
205Cavoukian and El Emam, 2011, p. 1.
206Sedayao 2012, p. 6. It should be noted that encryption might be a useful tool when anonymizing, for
example a certain part of a data set can be encrypted, which then anonymizes the data set, allowing later to
open the anonmyization. This option does however include some additional risks.
207WP 29, Opinion 05/2014, p. 3.
208In fact, there is no official guidance in Finland about the anonymization of data.
209Kuner, 2007, p. 66.
210 WP 29, Opinion 05/2014, p. 20.
211 It should be noted that it is possible to choose different classifications for the techniques. Millard 2013, p.
170.
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such techniques as noise addition, permutation and differential privacy. Generalization is
the second approach, which aims to dilute the data or generalize it in a way that it is not
possible to single out a data subject.212 I will not approach further these technical questions
or  the  risks  that  are  associated  to  individual  techniques.  The  analysis  will  remain  on  the
more general level of anonymization and the usability of anonymization in the context of
secondary use of data. It should be stated that in many cases several of these techniques
can be utilized, thus adding extra levels of security to the data subject’s privacy. WP 29
also strongly recommends a case-by-case analysis for each of these techniques, it is the
data controller’s duty to use appropriate safeguards and acknowledge the risks.213
WP 29 further analyzes each of these techniques and the risks included on the basis of
three categories of risks, which are singling-out, linkability and interference. I will use to
some extent the analysis in the following chapter, treating the question of re-identification.
As such, the concept of anonymization seems like godsend, resolving the whole conflict
between privacy of the data subjects and fundamental rights of data processors.
Anonymized data would fall outside of the concept of personal data and it would thus
liberate the commerce from the need to comply with data protection laws, and leave them
space for conducting commercial activities on data. At the same time, the principle right of
privacy would be secured. It would appear; however, that such a solution might be an
oversimplification, as the process of re-identification can nowadays be concluded
relatively easily and thus break the anonymization of the data.214 This has been shown in
the cases of AOL and Netflix, which will be later described in more detail. The second
problem for this hypothesis arrives from the commercial interest.215 Anonymized data
might not have similar value as non-anonymized data in the context of commercial use of
data,  which  might  lower  the  incentive  of  using  anonymization.  The  key  risks  of
anonymization as a safeguard for privacy are the failure of anonymization and devaluation
of  utility  of  the  data  anonymized.  These  two risks  will  be  analyzed  in  the  two following
subchapters, starting with the risk of re-identification, which is from the perspective of data
subject’s fundamental rights more important. The latter analysis of the effects of
anonymization on data utility or usability concerns the data processors more.
212Generalization consists of such techniques as aggregation and K-anonymity,  and L-Diversity/T-closeness
See for more information about the techniques in WP 29 Opinion 05/2014, pp. 11 - 18.
213WP 29 Opinion 05/2014, p. 24.
214 There is some controversy upon the fact whether reidentification is actually an easy process or not.
215 For example, Paul Ohm has claimed that anonymization and commercial use of data cannot be combined
since the process of anonymization devaluates data. Ohm, 2009-2010, pp. 1714 - 1715.
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3.2 Risk of Re-identification
The biggest risk with anonymized data is re-identification or de-anonymization. De-
identification may happen via data intrusions, the mosaic effect or jigsaw identification.
The de-anonymization can be done by an advisory that has the sufficient auxiliary
information, which can be for example acquired from public data. De-anonymization
means that the data is no longer anonymized and an individual may be singled out from the
material. Re-identification may be conducted by bringing new information and combining
it with the old data, which allows identifying or linking the anonymized data to another
revealing the identity of the persons behind the anonymized data.216 The data used on the
intrusion might be publicly available or known by the advisory by other means. In its
opinion, WP 29 treats the robustness of each anonymization from three different
perspectives:
“(i) is it still possible to single out an individual
(ii) is it still possible to link records relating to an individual, and
(iii) can information be inferred concerning an individual”217
From a judicial point of view, the important question is the risk of re-identification.218 In
other words, as put by WP 29, that is the robustness of anonymization.219 The problem of
re-identification is strongly connected with statistical confidentiality, which means that the
information is in such a form that it might be used without endangering privacy. 220 In
general, there are contradicting views on the risk of re-identification.221
There are two competing views on re-identification; the first one is that the anonymization
can be easily broken by an advisory222 the latter view criticizes this view stating that the
risk of re-identification is overstated and it is still a useful way of protecting the privacy of
data subjects.223 The first view is supported for example Paul Ohm, and the latter one for
216Duncan, Elliot and Salazar 2011, p. 177 and About Anonymisation, UK Anonymization Network, 2014.
217WP 29 Opinion 05/2014, p. 3.
218Completely risk free regulation cannot be achieved, it should be noted that from a law and economics risk
free solutions are rarely necessary.
219WP 29, Opinion 05/2014, p. 8.
220Duncan, Elliot and Salazar 2011, p. 2.
221Most of the discussion regarding anonymization is from the field of medical data and use of medical data,
this is because especially in that medical research sector there is a high need for  use of data in research, In
this thesis the focus is more in the commercial data. The examples of medical data are however used, since
not much research exists about anonymization in commercial context.
222Advisory is a concept loaned from computer science; it’s an imaginary person trying to gain access to data
about a certain other person.
223Ohm for example calls for the deleting of the word anonymize, since he sees the whole process impossible.
Ohm, 2009-2010, p. 1744.
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example by Ann Chavoukian.224  The problem with pseudonymous and anonymous
personal data arises from fast evolving technology: even though certain data sets can and
are anonymized, in the big data world it might be easily exposed.225 Also  according  to
Mayer Schönberger and Cukier, big data challenges the technical solution of
anonymization of data as well.226 It could be said that the anonymization techniques are in
constant race with the new re-identification technologies. There are multiple cases showing
previously anonymous or pseudonymous data converted into personal data via the new
models of re-identification.
The problem of re-identification is in connection with aggregation, which means the
collection of data in relation to a certain person. Small bits of data collected do not
themselves have value, and might not even be considered to be personal data, however, the
whole  of  these  parts  might  be  revealing  and  contain  a  lot  of  information.  The  combined
data reveals new private information in comparison to the individual bits of data.227 The
uses of such data can be highly beneficial in a commercial setting, especially when
targeting marketing to a certain person for an individually defined price.228
Aggregation of data may start with anonymous data, which leads to be de-anonymized in
the process; this creates unforeseeable risks for privacy, since the small bits of data are left
behind, for example, by using search engines or by visiting web pages.229According to the
ICO,  there  are  two  main  ways  of  achieving  re-identification.  In  the  first  scenario,  the
advisory uses already achieved personal data to identify a person from an anonymized data
set, and in the second one, the needed data for re-identification is obtained from public
records.230 An important publication on re-identification is Sweeneys k-anonymity, which
treats the problems with linking data from multiple sources, and identifying people from
such connected data.231 The focus of the Sweeney’s article is in statistic research and
protection  of  privacy  with  the  model  of  k-anonymity.  The  major  point  is  that  in  most  of
cases, race, sex and zip code are enough to identify a person living in the US meaning that
if these are available in a set of anonymized data, the person can be identified.232 Sweeneys
224Cavoukian and El Emam, 2011, p. 1 – 2.
225Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013, p. 155.
226Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, 2013, pp. 151 – 153.
227Solove, 2008, p. 118.
228Targeted marketing based to profiling may for example use data from the Facebook social graph, e-
commerce archives such as previously bought items.
229Solove, 2008, p. 119.
230ICO, 2012 Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, p. 19
231 Re-identification is used as a synonym of de-anonymization.
232Sweeney, 2002 and Wu, 2013, 1142.
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approach has been challenged by Barth-Jones, who claims that the identification shown is
based on the idea of a perfect population registry and also in the idea that the re-
identification can be done in such a way that in the end there is only one individual left to
whom the data may refer.233
There are two famous case examples of anonymization being broken, in both of these cases
large data sets of anonymized or pseydonymized data was published in the Internet. The
cases Netflix Prize and AOL show  the  risks  of  anonymized  data  being  re-
identifiable.234Narayanan and Shmatikov point out that datasets that can be linked to
publicly available data can be easily de-anonymized.235 In  the  case  of  Netflix,  this  was
done by linking the anonymized data of Netflix database to the data in IMDB-accounts.
Netflix published a data set of movie ratings by 500 000 customers containing anonymized
movie ratings; the intention was that people could help to develop the Netflix movie
recommendation algorithm in a competition. Narayanan and Shamatikov then created an
algorithm that demonstrates that with a little of technical knowledge it possible de-identify
parts of the data and identify individuals.236 The algorithm crawls data from IMDB using
that data for identify matching movie recommendations, being able to identify individuals
easily and with low margin of error. According to Narayanan and Shamatikov the
technique can also be used to other data sets of for example transactions data, proving that
anonymization is easy to break.237 The  AOL  case  gives  another  example  of  failure  of
anonymization, AOL decided to publish 20 million search queries for analysis and research
purposes. Each individual in the search queries was given an individual number. It was
possible to identify individual based to that given pseudonym by combining and analyzing
the searches the individual had done.238
In my opinion, even though these cases might show weakness in anonymization process,
they are not perfect examples of anonymization.239 In the context of commercial secondary
use, this is because in such use anonymized data would unlikely be published for large
amounts of people (publicity of the data), and the access to the data would be limited
(limited access). These additional safeguards might in fact help using data in the
233Barth-Jones, 2012, p. 1.
234 Schneier, 2007.
235 Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008, p. 1.
236 Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008, pp 8 - 9.
237 Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008, p. 12 and 14.
238Barbaro and Zeller 2014.
239 In fact, it could be claimed that the methods used do not fulfil the requirement of anonymization set by
WP 29, and that at least in the Netflix price the method was more closely related to pseudonymization.
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commercial context, in addition, taking into account that often data used for such activities
would not be medical data – but instead mundane activities such as click-streams and
information about commercial transactions such as orders. ICO also highlights that
different forms of disclosure of data have different risks of re-identification: limiting
access allows disclosure of richer data.240 Additionally, the case of Southern Illinoisan v.
Illinois Department of Public Health supports this conclusion.241 The  court  heard  Dr.
Sweeney about the de-anonymization of data and made a decision that the de-
anonymization process in that case was based on special knowledge of medical area, and
could not thus be made by the easy use of Excel, as Dr. Sweeney claimed.242 I support this
approach, since if anonymization were assessed by the standards of a skilled computer
scientist or hacker, anonymization would truly be impossible. This would mean that the
result of every assessment would be that anonymization might be broken. Jane Yakowitz
has also analyzed this case, and made the claim that the easy re-identification is only a
myth.243 Yakowitz also makes an interesting point that the harm of de-anonymization is
often overstated. First according to Yakowitz, the possibility of de-identification is
overstated,  since  big  portion  of  the  individuals  in  the  data  sets  are  not  in  risk  of  being
identified, only a small portion of the data set is in the risk of identification.244 Second not
all data acts as a potential identifier, meaning that it is possible to anonymize data.245
Thirdly, a common man cannot easily de-anonymize data sets; in fact, de-anonymization
requires a lot of specialist knowledge.246 Additionally, in fact, the value of the data the
advisory obtains is quite low.247 The findings of Yakowitz have to be considered when
regulating anonymization and considering the benefits and strengths of the technology. The
risk of re-identification might actually be much smaller than claimed by Ohm.248
Assessing anonymization and the risk of re-identification is an important part of using such
techniques. The WP 29 opinion and the ICO guidance, provide tools for such assessment.
240ICO, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, p. 36.
241It should be noted that this case is from the relatively different US context – and it is impossible to uses it
as a legal source in the European context. The case should be still considered as it has brought anonymization
in the courtroom in the judicial analysis of judges.
242Even though this case is a US based, it is one of the few court decisions on anonymization. Background,
Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health.
243Yakowitz, 2011-2012, p. 31.
244 Yakowitz, 2011-2012, pp. 21 - 22.
245 I will return to this argument in the next subchapter about the value of data, Yakowitz 2011-2012, p. 23
and 28.
246 Yakowitz 2011-2012, p. 33.
247Yakowitz 2011-2012, 34 - 35.
248Ohm, 2009-2010, p. 1705 - 1705.
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ICO has created the motivated intruder test for analyzing such situations. The motivated
intruder test consists of two parts, firstly, it should be assessed whether disclosing the data
is likely to result in re-identification, and secondly, whether anyone would be motivated to
achieve re-identification. The motivated intruder is a motivated common man, who does
not possess any unique skills in connection to de-anonymization, such as hacking. The
approach is thus similar to the one adopted by Yakowitz and Southern Illinoisan. Sources
of motivation are classified to contain, for example, financial gains, gaining newsworthy
information or the motivation to embarrass the data subject.249 Steps  that  ICO advises  to
take as a part of assessing the risk of re-identification of individuals, include, among
others, seeing if it possible to combine social media data to an individual in the data set,
and seeing local resources such as electoral register and library resources in connection
with the data.250 The WP 29 approaches the risk in the form of a more detailed analysis,
providing analysis of different anonymization techniques, noting also that since
anonymization techniques are under constant research, it might be hard to assess all the
risks currently.251 This  also  causes  the  risk  of  re-identification  to  vary  over  time,  which
should also be noted by the data controller.252
In the context of commercial secondary use, I would claim that anonymization of data is a
viable solution, and that the risks are lower than in the medical context. This is due to two
factors. Firstly, the data collected is not often as sensitive in nature; secondly, it is possible
to restrict access to the data, since the purpose is not to do research that would require
public access.253 Cavoukian and El Emam have also maintained a similar position,
protecting the value of de-identification, even though it is not a completely certain
measure.254 The motivated intruder test leads to some steps that the data processor must
consider. In the commercial context, the restriction of access is the most important
solution, since if the anonymized data is accessed only by a low number of people; the risk
of re-identification is lowered greatly.  For the data controller, this means having an
internal governance model or privacy program, and the necessary technical and
organizational safeguards for restricting and monitoring access. For example, the concrete
steps could consist of limiting the data use for only certain projects, or for only certain
249ICO  2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, p. 22 - 23.
250ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice 2012, p. 23 - 24.
251WP, Opinion 05/2014, p. 12.
252WP, Opinion 05/2014, p. 24.
253Also Ohm notes that the non-public disclosure might in fact be less risky. Ohm, 2009-2010, p. 1729 –
1730.
254Cavoukian and El Emam, 2011, p.  4.
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individuals,  as  well  as  limiting  the  copying  of  data  and  disclosure  of  the  data.  In  the
organizational scale, measures taken could include training of staff and organizational
security.255 WP  29  has  also  advised  taking  into  account  the  disclosure  and  control
measures, when analyzing the robustness of anonymization.256
I suggest that anonymization rules should base on a risk-based approach. Anonymization
should be encouraged to allow the secondary use of data, whenever the risks are low
enough, this approach is explored more in the chapter 5 of this thesis. Simply put the risk-
based anonymization in marketing context could for instance mean that data could be used
for creating anonymized profiles, even though there would be a slight risk of re-
identification and loss of privacy – this is due the fact that the commercial benefits would
in  my  opinion  weight  more  than  the  minuscule  risk  of  loss  of  privacy.  The  risk  of  re-
identification should, however, be taken into consideration when regulating
anonymization. In the context of research, the risks as well as the benefits of the data use
are different. In commercial use of data, the benefits are of economic nature. My view is
that the legislators should not completely change the approach to anonymization, the gains
of anonymization in different fields are simply too great to be lost for the increased
privacy. The next subchapter analyzes devaluation utility, which from the perspective of
commerce is an even greater problem than re-identification. The loss of utility is in
connection with the usability of data that has been anonymized. Data utility is part of the
greater superquestion of this thesis; the values balanced against each other are privacy and
the commercial interests of the controller.
There are highly varying opinions on re-identification as well as on the value of data after
anonymization. There is a definitive need to have new guidance for anonymization, EU-
widely, activities such as data-mining can be extremely valuable, and thus the legal
framework for the techniques should be in place. Already a lot of activities in commerce
depend on the use of anonymized data. A good example of such practices is Telefonica
Insights that collects mobile data, anonymizes it and then uses the data for analytics. The
data can be used for monitoring crowd movements, this can be used analyzing how
interested is the crowd of a store or how does competition affect the movements.257
255ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice, pp. 37 - 39
256WP 29, Opinion 05/2014, p. 25.
257 Telefonica 2014.
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Another example is SiSense that provides retailers tools for analytics, that combine data
from various sources and then visualizes the data for analysis.258
3.3 Devaluation of Data Utility
Data utility means the usability of the data; this definition includes the quality of the data
and its analytical value. In the commercial secondary use of data, this could be, for
example, usability in marketing, profiling or customer research.
“A summary term describing the value of a given data release as an
analytical resource. This comprises the data’s analytical completeness and its
analytical validity. Disclosure control methods usually have an adverse
effect on data utility. Ideally, the goal of any disclosure control regime
should be to maximize data utility whilst minimizing disclosure risk. In
practice disclosure control decisions are a trade-off between utility and
disclosure risk.”259
The definition from the OECD summarizes some of the conflicting elements in data utility;
lowering the risk of re-identification also often lowers the data utility. From an economics
of law perspective, the level of anonymization should be set to a point where privacy is
protected, but the value of data is not lost. In the level of fundamental rights, the data
utility discussion contains a collision; the values against each are utility (protected by
effective markets or the fundamental rights of the controller) and privacy. From the
perspective of the data subjects, it would be perfect if the risk of re-identification would be
zero, as the data utility does not concern the data subjects – the controller’s interest would
be to have as good quality data available as possible.
Although the risks of re-identification could be overstated, it must be analyzed whether the
anonymized data still has value for commercial purposes. If the anonymized data is not
valuable anonymization might not work as the key to secondary use of data. Another
option is that the commercial player will not anonymize data if the value drops too much.
The case might also be that in statistical research, anonymized data is valuable, but in
commercial sense, for example, for marketing activities anonymization devaluates the data,
thus lowering the incentive to use the data or anonymization models.
Businesses that uses data could be roughly divided to data collectors – which are the
parties that collect our data, data marketers (or aggregators), data users, for example,
advertising companies; and data protectors, which are businesses that make money by
258 SiSense 2014
259 OECD Statistics Glossary 2005, Data Utility.
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providing protection for privacy.260 There are several large data broker firms, for example,
US based Acxiom, which is one of the largest data-relying marketers, and as stated by New
York Times, they have high capacities of data and extensive knowledge about
consumers.261 Other large data broker firms include Experian and Epsilon.262 In the
European context, for example, Telefonica has founded a separate company Telefonica
Insights, for selling anonymous and aggregated subscriber data.263
From a European point of view, the question is whether data can be anonymized in a way
that  it  is  in  compliance  with  the  DPD  or  in  the  future,  the  General  Data  Protection
Regulation, and at the same time be valuable. This question is entwined with the
previously explored debate about the possibility of reidentification. Ohm views that
achieving anonymity destroys the value of data in most cases. The statement is that utility
and privacy are concepts in war, and achieving the other requires lowering the other.
Modest gains in privacy might result to complete destruction of utility in certain models.264
Yakowitz has criticized Ohms view. Yakowitz claims that Ohms assumption is erroneous,
especially when it comes to the value of anonymized data sets in the context of research.265
This other perspective is that the devaluation of anonymized data is not as drastic as
presented in Ohms work.266 In my opinion anonymization acts as a valuable too, even
though some of the value of data is apparently removed. This is only natural since for the
protection of privacy some of the identifiers need to be removed. However in many fields
the data can still be used to comprise profiles of consumption habits in certain geographic
areas and concentrate marketing to those locations. Additionally the data masses may also
be used to improve the processes and, for example, inventory control – if anonymized data
sets show that there is a demand for a certain color of cars that may be taken into account
already in the production in real time.
Can perfect anonymity and marketing be combined? At least in connection of marketing or
individual price discrimination this is not possible, however if the market segment is larger
and the individuals cannot be likely be identified – the process of anonymization and
260Craig and Lundloff 2011, p. 51.
261 Acxiom holds data of 190 million individuals and 126 million households in the United States.  It has for
example also worked with the government after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, providing information
about 11 of the 19 hijackers. This shows their identification capacity. Singer 2014
262Epsilon 2014 and Experian 2014
263Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, p. 107 and Telefonica 2014.
264Ohm, 2009-2010, p. 1752 - 1753.
265Yakowitz, 2011-2012, pp. 8-10 and 62 - 64.
266Yakowitz, 2011-2012, 30 - 31.
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marketing can be combined, especially if using the access controls to further ensure the
fundamental rights. Although there is great controversy on the issue of utility and privacy,
since re-identification arises great problems to anonymization techniques, my view is that
we should regulate anonymization taking into account the risk factors. Anonymization
process is currently the best way of achieving usability for data and the cost and benefits
for commerce are enormous. Anonymization does affect the value of data, that is certain.
However,  without the use of anonymization it  would not be possible to use data in many
cases, as the use would not be legitimate or within the previously purpose for data
collection. This is due the role anonymization plays both as a risk-redactor allowing the
data processing in some DPD article 7(f) scenarios and additionally because if done
properly the data protection laws do not apply to the processing of truly anonymized data.
This  strengthens  the  role  of  anonymization  in  the  era  of  big  data,  even  though,  there  are
concerns about both devaluation and reidentification.
The excursions to re-identification and value of data give a rather dualist view on
anonymization. The following chapter treats enforcement of privacy, since anonymization
does not provide us certain solutions for resolving the principal right oriented conflict; a re-
emphasis on enforcement and sanctions is needed. This is needed, since use of secondary
data is needed and if there are no technical methods for the use and the legal framework is
too strict, there is a high probability for non-compliance.267 Compliance and
anonymization may give certain remedies for commerce that wishes to use data for
secondary purposes. With the strict purpose restriction and legitimacy requirements on
secondary use of data and limited applicability of anonymization, there is a clear incentive
for non-compliance.  The enforcement practices, especially low sanctions, are behind this.
The current situation leads to a double loss of rights – commerce safeguarding fundamental
rights loses to the commerce that is non-compliantly using data for economic benefit. Both
economic loss and loss of fundamental rights could be prevented by increasing the level of
sanctions. In the next chapter, I will explore the European approach to sanctions, as well as
show how the US approach to sanctions is much more efficient in multiple areas.
Additional emphasis is placed on the regulation proposal by the European commission.
Prima facie the next chapter about sanctions treats the relationship between DPAs and data
controllers, and the data subject fades behind. I would emphasize that the loss of rights by
non-compliant data use violates especially the privacy of the data subjects.
267Brinhack and Elkin-Koren, 2011 and SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 359 p. 2. More than 70% of people
are concerned by the use of data to other purposes than the presented one.
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4 Sanctioning Unauthorized Data Use
4.1 Protection of Privacy Requires Sanctions
The value of data creates an incentive for crime and non-compliant behavior in relation
with the data protection laws. According to a major study conducted by Brinhack and
Elkin-Koren, big portion of internet activities does not comply with norms in connection
with collection of personal data.  Especially the collection of data without giving the user
sufficient notice or controls is a widespread problem.268 The lack of credible sanctions is in
fact one of the factors that has been noted in the impact assessment that was conducted as a
background material for the GDPR.269 For this reason, it is vital to provide insights into the
shortcomings of current enforcement, even though the draft regulation will strengthen and
harmonize enforcement.270 There  is  the  risk  that  the  GDPR  will  not  actually  solve  the
problem in relation with sanctions. Prior venturing to the current levels of fines for
unlawful commercial sector data processing in EU and US, it is important to analyze the
theories of sanctions and enforcement from the perspective of law and economics.
Enforcement has been described as the act of ensuring compliance with legislation. This
definition sees enforcement as modification of behavior.271 In this chapter, enforcement is
analyzed from the sanctions perspective, sanctions are only a part of enforcement, and
there are also other aspects  In the context of data protection law, enforcement in my
opinion means a wide array of possible tools to control the data controller, for instance,
auditing  by  DPA  or  the  US  FTC  consent  order.  The  claim  is  that  sanctions  create  the
incentive for data controllers to safeguard privacy of the data subjects.272 This is also well
in  line  with  the  opinion  of  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  of  EU.273 Too low sanctions
benefit  parties  that  do  not  consider  privacy.  Law  and  economics  shows  clearly  that
externalities should be controlled. The importance of sanctions also gain extra weight, if
the theories on privacy as a commons or collective are taken into account (i.e. privacy
commons274 view or privacy as a resource275) the importance of sanctions is highlighted.
268Brinhack and Elkin-Koren 2011, p. 363 and 366
269 Commission 2010, Impact Assessment GDPR , p. 30.
270 GDPR, p. 92 – 93.
271DREAM framework can be used as an analysis model for enforcement. Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012,
p. 227
272Equity of sanctions is an equally important part of defining the correct level of sanctions.
273 Data Protection in the European Union: the role of National Data Protection Authorities 2010 p, 8.
274Yakowitz, 2011-2012
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The privacy commons view also allows deriving from R. H. Coase, who has addressed the
problem of social cost, which means, for example, the harm caused by a factory polluting,
and the measures that can be taken to protect people from this harm.276 Coase analyzes the
question of whether the party causing damage is liable, and how the responsibility of
caused damage is allocated efficiently between the parties.277 The theory of social  cost  is
well in line with the fact that there are potential economic gains in exploitation of personal
data. In addition to Coases theorem, the theory of rational crime shows the importance of
sanctioning activities that violate rights and may benefit the violator. The theory also
highlights the fact that if the combination of risk being caught and the cost of being caught
is lower there is an incentive for committing the crime.278 In the context of data protection,
this means that if the cost of a privacy violation is lower than the possibility of sanctions
(fines, audit) and public relations damages, the controller has no incentive for safeguarding
privacy,  which  is  especially  problematic,  noting  the  dual  role  of  the  controller  as  a
protector of fundamental rights. Also in the history of regulation, there are good examples
about how regulation alone is not enough. For example, environmental pollution and
practices such as dumping give good examples of this. Prior environmental regulation,
sanctions and enforcement it was commonplace to dump waste to rivers. Similarly also
creation of monopolies, cartels and information exchange between competitors was
common and it did not stop prior the anti-trust legislation entered into force with high
sanctions.279 In both of these fields the sanctions for non-compliant behavior is much
higher than it is for data protection violations or breaches of data protection law.
The next subchapter will focus on the FTC enforcement of privacy in the US. It acts as a
benchmark to the enforcement in the Member States, and can thus gives further input for
the  analysis  of  sanctions  in  the  EU.280 Prior to venturing into the FTC enforcement of
privacy laws, it is important to address the difference of privacy regulation in the US. The
275Karl Muth argues that privacy should be seen from a natural resources point of view, building an allusion
to preservation of forests and timber industry. Muth  2009 pp. 346 – 347 and 351.
276Coase 1960, p. 1.
277Coase 1960, p.5 -6.
278In addition the theory of rational crime argues for punishment because, if only compensation is paid there
is an incentive for violations. Cooter and Ulen 2014, pp. , 458 - 459.
279This happened first in the US and later on in the Europe via the actions of EU. The sanctions have been set
high since the gains for monopolies and cartels are also high, the consumer loses when such activities are
done. See more about the history of competition law Massimo Motta 2004 Competition Policy, p. 2 – 15 and
about consumer welfare p. 19 - 20.
280Oker-Blom 2009, p. 192. As stated by Oker-Blom the different legal realities are in competition, and in a
way they compete for clients, from this perspective it can be highly useful to analyze competing legal
realities.
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purpose is not to give a detailed analysis of US privacy law, nor to analyze the differences
of the law this would not serve the research question of this thesis.
4.2 Federal Trade Commission as a DPA
US approach varies greatly from the European approach, starting from the view to privacy,
which in Europe is more understood from the view of personal integrity, and the US
approach more about the right to be left alone. This will focus on the enforcement of FTC,
giving perspective to the European enforcement. The enforcement in connection with
commercial secondary use falls under the regimen of FTC, which is the federal agency for
safeguarding the consumer’s rights.281 In the USA, there is no universal privacy legislation;
privacy is regulated in sectoral laws, as a part of consumer protection in the consumer
protection laws, or in separate sector laws, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act or The
Children’s Online Privacy Act. There are certain areas of privacy in the US that are heavily
regulated by federal regulation, such as the Health Privacy Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which regulates the healthcare sector data.282  It  has  been
claimed that the US has a much more liberal approach, and less legislation, in connection
with commercial secondary use of personal data.283 In a recent article by Solove &
Hartzog, the authors claim that this claim is outdated, since the FTC has developed
widespread jurisprudence around privacy via enforcing the privacy policies of the
companies as their promises.284 Solove & Hartzog bring out the fact, that even though there
are many areas uncovered by the privacy regulation on the federal level, the FTC
regulation covers these areas285 by taking action against companies that do not keep their
privacy promises:
“Although these enormous areas are for the most part unregulated by any industry-specific
statute, they are nevertheless regulated. A substantial number of companies today nearly
every large company, have privacy policies, and privacy policies are enforced by the FTC.
The FTC can bring an action against a company for breaching a promise in its privacy policy
–and, even more broadly, for any deceptive or unfair act of practice. This fact has efficiently
given the FTC a sprawling jurisdiction to enforce privacy in addition to the statutory
jurisdiction.”286
281See Federal Trade Commission, Enforcing Privacy Promises.
282 For a detailed presentation on the different sector laws that exist in US in connection with Privacy, see
Solove and Schwartz, 2009.
283This claim has been made by for example Yu, McLaughlin and Levy, 2014, p.11.
284Solove and Hartzog 2014, p. 586.
285Solove and Hartzog 2014, p. 587.
286Solove and Hartzog 2014, p. 588.
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This could be concluded by saying that the FTC acts as the de facto data protection
authority  in  the  US,  with  widespread  powers  to  enforce  privacy.  In  comparison  to  the
European level of sanctions, the commercial sector US enforcement has shown much
higher sanctions.287 There are, however, controversies around the FTC enforcement; it has,
been described as ‘toothless and low-tech’ by Peter Maass.288 My view is that even though
FTC  has  its  shortcomings  and  room  for  critique,  the  European  legislators  should  take  a
closer look at the FTC practices, especially since it has shown great capabilities with
adapting self-regulating schemes and since the sanction sums are generally higher.289
What  are  the  powers  of  the  FTC  then,  and  what  makes  it  so  different  of  our  European
DPAs. FTC has different powers, these have been categorized into three categories by
Solove and Hartzog: the power of investigation, enforcement and litigation.290  The typical
privacy issue starts from an FTC investigation, which usually stems from activities from
either complaining consumers or press. When the FTC decides to bring action, it will raise
a complaint; the reaction to a complaint can be either settled or disputed in front of an
administrative or federal district court judge. The FTC typically settles cases by a consent
order,  which does not require admission of guilt  by the targeted company. These consent
orders act as the future basis for enforcement actions. The future sanction for each
violation of the consent order is up to $16 000 per violation.291 In  the  light  of  this
description, FTC enforcement could be classified to be act-based: the enforcement actions
are taken when an act is noticed.292 In addition, the settlement-nature of the consent orders
adds an aspect of soft law, or the so-called compliance approach as described by
Baldwin.293 The consent orders duration can go up to 20 years, and it may contain orders
for audits and organizational measures for taking care of privacy. Normally a consent order
contains three aspects: financial penalties, bans for activities and recommendations for
corrective actions.294 The variation in monetary sanctions has been high; the fines range
from  $1  000  to  35  million  dollars.  I  will  not  analyze  the  nature  of  the  fines,  but  instead
287It should be noted that the sanctions given by FTC are not per se administrative fines, but agreements or
settlements that are enforced in courts. The FTC consent order gives obligations to the company that accepts
to it and if it is broken, it can be then enforced in the court.
288Maass 2014 .
289The FTC approach has especially from a historical perspective been strongly in connection with self-
regulation and adding extra punch by enforcing the promises given by companies, see more Solove and
Hartzog, 2014, p. 594 and 598.
290Solove & Hartzog 2014, p. 608.
291Solove and Hartzog 2014, pp. 609 - 610.
292Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2012, p. 245.
293 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2012, p. 239.
294This is not a complete analysis of the aspects of consent orders; see more Solove and Hartzog 2014, p. 614.
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concentrate on the monetary amounts. The following cases shed light to the FTC
enforcement, as well as analyzing the sanctions amounts that have been issued. The goal is
not to offer a comprehensive list of FTC enforcement cases.295
Google Safari  (Decision and Later Enforcement),  the FTC enforcement of 22,5m$ shows
that Federal Trade Commission is clearly in a better position for giving sanctions than the
European DPAs.296 In the FTC case of Google v. US District Court, Google was forced to
pay 22,5 million USD in fines for the opt-out practices in connection with the
misinformation provided to Safari users about marketing cookies of DoubleClick
Advertising and the use of Google Buzz.297 Google expressly told Safari users that they do
not need to opt-out from targeted advertising on Safari. Despite its representations,
however, Google conducted such marketing, having the cookie to store the user
information for targeted DoubleClick marketing.298
As previously stated the strength of FTC enforcement is not merely due to the fines the
commission might set. The case of Vision I Properties was about the fact that Vision I
rented and sold personal data collected via their service of e-commerce shopping carts,
which they provided to online vendors, without mention of the possibility of such
activities.299  FTC merely ordered a $9 000 fine as a disgorgement and prohibited the
activities. In addition, the order included auditing and a prohibition to rent or sell personal
data that had been collected prior to the order to change their privacy policy.300 The FTC
strength lies in this flexibility of consent orders, they contain rules for the future operations
and the violation then triggers the sanctioning mechanism. The high sanctions FTC may
issue are only one of the remedies; a more common approach is a settlement made, which
may for example include external auditing of privacy, or changes in policies. In my view,
the high penalties act as a “boost” to the data controllers to safeguard privacy.301 In
general, it could be stated that FTC enforcement takes care of the fact that companies need
to keep their promises regarding privacy; for example, this includes the recent enforcement
in cases where the parties have not been properly safe harbor-certified.
295FTC ‘Enforcing Privacy Promises’ and Solove & Hartzog 2014, pp. 612 - 615.
296For the theory of optimal punishment, see e.g. Friedman 2000, pp. 227 - 229.
297B.  Adequacy of the Civil Penalty, District Order Approving Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction -
Google Safari and Statement of The Commission  United States of America v. Google Inc., 2012.
298Factual Background, District Order Approving Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction -Google Safari
299Vision I Properties
300Solove and Schwartz 2009,  p. 423 - 424.
301The FTC has enforcement jurisdiction especially in the cases in which the companies do not fulfil their
promises given in the privacy policies; this is in more limited in comparison to the European authorities.
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However, it should be noted, that in comparison to the European data protection
authorities, the jurisdiction of FTC is much vaguer, and the fragmented nature of US data
protection laws (or lack of such laws) creates some problematic situations. Raab and
Bennet have seen that the lack of private sector regulation has especially problematic
privacy.302 The US enforcement regimen is not perfect either; the sectoral approach to law
creates different enforcement across sectors. In some pockets of the law, there is strong
enforcement. The FTC takes privacy among other consumer rights, and safeguards the
consumer’s right to trust the promises of privacy given to them. The clear advantage of the
European system is that enforcement actions are brought cross-sector by a clearly
appointed administrative enforcer. However, in my opinion, EU DPAs would have much
to  learn  in  two aspects,  which  are  the  amount  of  sanctions  and  the  flexibility  of  consent
orders in bringing forth corrective actions. De lege ferenda it should be considered whether
the flexibility of consent orders could be bought to Europe. In addition, the problem in US
seems to be also the fact the FTC does not always catch the wrongdoers, due the limited
resources. This creates incentive for non-compliance as the economic theory of rational
crime proves.
As a concluding note on the FTC enforcement, it should be stated that even though FTCs
role as the privacy enforcer can be critiqued, we could use the practice as a good
benchmark when defining a European approach to fines. According to Baldwin a higher
level of sanctions can increase the preventive nature of the sanctions.303 This preventive
nature would heighten the importance of data subject’s right to privacy and thus provide
the necessary safeguards for the e-consumers fading privacy. In the same time, the
sanctions would promote healthy law-obliging competition in the electronic markets. The
next two subchapters will analyze the sanctions in European Union. The emphasis of the
next subchapter is on the problems that the fragmented or disharmonized approach creates.
4.3 European Approach to Sanctions
In the first subchapter of this chapter on sanctions, it was established that both the theory of
rational crime and the Coases theory of social cost explain why non-enforced or non-
regulated economic environments are problematic. An unenforced statute, law or
regulation creates an incentive for non-compliant behavior, since it is more profitable than
302Bennett and Raab 2006, p. 131.
303Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2012, pp. 244 - 245.
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complying  with  the  rule.  This  is  true  for  all  of  the  areas  of  data  protection  that  contain
possibilities for monetary gains. As an example, data transfers are conducted commonly
without the proper authorization.304 It is only logical that secondary use of data would also
be done against the statue. First, it is unlikely to be caught and second the consequences for
getting caught are low, the most likely penalty would be soft law advice from the DPA or
less than million euros in sanctions. From the perspective of data subject’s privacy, the
lack of enforcement and levels of fines further worsen this across EU.
No uniform approach to sanctions on privacy violations exist within the European single
market.305 The FRA has summarized the problem into three aspects. Firstly, in some
jurisdiction, sanctions are limited or non-existing, secondly DPAs across EU generally
prefer soft instruments and thirdly there are certain rules and mechanisms that limit
seeking compensation via the courts.306 Additionally  many  DPAs  across  Member  States
are under-resourced.307
The article 26 of the DPD states that an individual suffering harm due to unlawful
processing of personal data is entitled to receive sufficient compensation. In the DPD
article 27, EU sets an obligation to set necessary sanctions and enforcement processes on a
national level. The varying implementation of the DPD has caused great variation across
the European jurisdictions on the issue of enforcement. In reality in many areas, the reality
of European Data Protection does not meet the requirements set in the DPD and the data
subject’s fundamental rights are not fulfilled.308 The variation in enforcement means that
some Member States have strong DPAs while others have DPAs with a softer approach.309
Lee Bygrave has claimed that the DPD enforcement is done in the ‘spirit of soft law’,
without much using sanctions and official enforcement as part of the administrative
actions.310 In addition, FRA has criticized the soft approach to the issues.311
There are problems with enforcement in multiple Member States. For example, Finland is
a  good  example  of  a  country  with  a  softer  approach.  The  DPA  has  no  power  for  giving
304Kuner 2013 pp, 144 - 145.
305Commission 2010, GDPR Impact Assessment, p. 49 and 52.
306 These include, for example, quantifying of damage and burden of proof in data protection violations cases
FRA 2010, Data Protection in the European Union: the role of National Data Protection Authorities, p. 6.
307FRA 2010, p. 42 and Kuner 2013, p. 4.
308Commission 2010, Impact Assessment GDPR, p. 25 and FRA 2010 pp, 42 - 43.
309This is understandable since two distinct styles of enforcement can be seen. These have be called
compliance approach which supports more soft methods and deterrence or sanctioning that supports stronger
means to achieve the same end, Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p. 239.
310Bygrave, 2002, p. 79.
311FRA 2010, p. 20 and 43.
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administrative fines on privacy violations, and the de facto potential  remedies  are  within
the civil and criminal law.312 Section 47 of the Personal Data Act sets the possibility of tort
liability in cases where the statute is violated.313 This covers economic and other losses.
Section  9  of  Chapter  38  of  the  Finnish  Criminal  Code  sets  the  possibility  of  criminal
charges for individuals intentionally or grossly negligently performing activities violating
the Personal Data Act. In practice, no cases of data controller liability exist in Finland. The
tort liability may occur, even if there was no negligence in part of the data controller.314
Even though in theory a data controller could be liable for data protection practices, to this
date no such cases exist.
In UK, France and Spain there are monetary sanctions in some scenarios, although the
sanctions are modest in their monetary value. For example, in Spain the LOPD (Ley
Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal)
contains three categories of severity for data protection violations article allowing
sanctions ranging from 900€ to 600 000€.  Also in the UK sanctions go up to £500 000, in
France  the  sanctions  can  go  up  only  to  150  000€;  which  is  the  amount  imposed  to  for
example Google for recent non-compliant behavior in relation with Google Buzz.315 The
monetary value of these sanctions is considerably low when considering the potential value
of secondary uses of data. It is quite clear that they do not prevent non-compliant behavior
or efficiently punish such activities. As Kuner states additional problems arise with
jurisdictional questions, these questions include the questions of establishment and
choosing the law that applies.316
The problems of current Member State sanctions can be crystallized into three areas. The
sanctions monetary effect is either weak due monetary reasons, the soft approach is
practiced and no sanctions are issued or the DPA does not have the sufficient resources for
detecting and enforcing non-compliant behavior. In some cases it might be so that all of the
three causes co-exist, making the enforcement of the national implementation of the DPD
virtually impossible.  For these reasons,  I  see that the Commissions proposal in GDPR to
increase  the  fines  and  harmonize  DPAs  activities  is  a  good  starting  point  for  fixing  the
enforcement of data protection.
312FRA notes that there are problems in relation with enforcement in the following Member States: Finland,
Hungary, Lithuania, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Austria, United Kingdom, and Ireland. FRA 2010, p. 43.
313 Torts however have the problem of classification of sanctions.
314For a further reading on sanctions in Finnish context, see e.g., Vanto, 2011, p. 175.
315 CNIL, Délibération n. 2013-420, p. 27.
316In the current state, there is the risk for forum shopping for the lowest possible enforcement. Kuner, 2007,
p. 50.
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4.4 Commission Proposal on Sanctions
The proposed new European Regulation addresses many of the problems in connection
with  the  monetary  amount  of  the  sanctions.  In  the  new  Proposal  for  European  Data
Protection Regulation, sanctions are higher and sanctioning would be uniform and EU-
wide. This would solve the problems in connection with non-uniform sanctions and affect
the incentive to process data without complying with the regulation. In connection with the
anonymization of data, it would seem that in this area the proposed GDPR would solve the
problems. The problem is however, that too high sanctions in combination with strict
norms on purpose restriction may cause problems.
The proposed GDPR would in article 47 establish independent and well-resourced data
protection authorities that have the all the required powers. According to article 46 the
authorities would also collaborate EU-wide.317 The intention of the regulation is to create a
one-stop shop system that would benefit companies across Europe, since they could take
care of all data protection matters with only one DPA in one Member State.318 Article 79
treats the administrative sanctions, according to the article the sanctions shall:
“The administrative sanction shall be in each individual case effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. The amount of the administrative fine shall be
fixed with due regard to the nature, gravity and duration of the breach, the
intentional or negligent character of the infringement, the degree of
responsibility of the natural or legal person and of previous breaches by this
person, the technical and organisational measures and procedures
implemented pursuant to Article 23 and the degree of cooperation with the
supervisory authority in order to remedy the breach.”319
Commission has set extra measures that individuals processing data as well as small and
medium enterprises would not be affected negatively by the sanctions.320 The sanctions
would clearly increase the powers of DPAs. The initial proposal by European Commission
was from 250 000€ to one million or 0,5 – 2% the annual global turnover.321 The EU
Parliament amended this to from 1 – 5% of the annual global turnover.322 To demonstrate
the whole change of paradigm in European fines, it is good to see what would this mean
for example, if Google violated the GDPR. A bad violation would cost Google between
600 million and 3 billion USD or in euros approximately 450 million to 2.3 billion
317 European Commission, 2012General Data Protection Regulation, p. 75 - 76.
318 General Data Protection Regulation , 32.
319GDPR, p. 92.
320GDPR, p. 92.
321GDPR, pp. 92 - 93.
322 Commission 2014, MEMO 14/186.
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euros.323 This is a huge increase from the current level of fines, which are in maximum 0.5
million euros in the UK, or the 150 000 € fines Google got from CNIL.324 The change is a
drastic one, especially compared to the current situation of enforcement. However, as
previously shown, change to the European enforcement is needed. The sanctions would
also  be  high  in  comparison  with  the  FTC  sanctions,  however  as  stated  by  Solove  and
Hartzog the FTC sanctions are relatively small when viewing the global turnover of the
violators.325
The fact is in fact, there is surprisingly little material or economic research behind setting
the levels of fines. No complete economic analysis has been conducted about the potential
effects that the sanctions have.  With an analogous comparison to sanctions in the area of
antitrust  law,  the  Parliament  proposal  of  5%  sanctions  seems  highly  overstated.  In  for
example the antitrust case against Microsoft the commission gave out 560 million euros for
failing to uphold an antitrust settlement.326 In an antitrust case against Intel, the
commission ordered sanctions 1.06 billion euros to Intel for abuse of dominant market
position.327 Mirroring the cost of a data protection violation to violations of antitrust law, I
would state that the original commission proposal of 1-2% sanctions would be sufficient.
Whether  in  the  final  regulation  the  level  of  the  sanctions  will  be  1  –  2%  of  the  global
turnover or even 5%, it is clear that there are big fundamental right and equality questions
when issuing such sanctions. It should be asked how the DPAs would take their new role
as enforcers, and whether the administrative enforcement is the correct forum for  the
enforcement. In addition, the potential high amount of the sanctions should be notified
when reforming data protection authorities. Enforcing authorities should be properly
resourced and they should as well be trained to take the new big responsibility. This creates
a  great  need  for  principles  of  good administration  and  arises  the  question  whether  DPAs
are the correct enforcers for sanctions.
Calculation of the sanctions under the new regulation might also be un-proportional, for
example, in a case in which a subcontractor or affiliate of a global information technology
company acts against the data protection regulation; the sanction will be calculated in the
basis of the global annual turnover. This creates problems, since not always are the major
323Google revenue for 2013 was approximately 60 billion US$. See for the revenue of Google
http://www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-global-revenue/.
324CNIL, Délibération n. 2013-420, p. 27
325 Solove & Hartzog 2014, p. 605.
326 Spencer Kimball, 2013.
327 Commission MEMO/09/235.
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entities in full control of their affiliates and for example of the marketing activities done
locally. Other issues that need to be resolved arise in connection with forum shopping;
what if a company sets into a location in which enforcement is relaxed – will a DPA in
another EU country set sanctions? The problem is that in some jurisdictions the DPAs have
clearly adopted an approach of soft law and even though they would have the resources
and powers to give out sanctions, they would not do so.
Although, the analysis is mainly in connection with the fines, I see that other instruments
should also be mentioned, since they could also help to protect privacy of the data subjects.
For example class action suits, could act as an incentive for complying with data protection
laws, even in scenarios where monetary gains are big. In most of the cases the problem is
however establishing a monetary damage value for the loss of privacy. The whole doctrine
in  this  area  should  change  so  that  class  actions  could  be  an  effective  solution.328 Privacy
torts could also be a possible solution, but similarly to class actions, they have the problem
of valuation of privacy.329 In my opinion, these court-based solutions do not give sufficient
safeguards  to  the  data  subjects,  who  as  noted  by  Lessig,  are  often  without  much
representation.330 If privacy class action suits could however be led by the DPAs or NGOs,
this problem would be solved. However the problem of valuating privacy in monetary
terms would remain. For this reason, administrative sanctions that are given out in a cross-
European way, eliminating the possibility of forum shopping, are an advisable measure
that should be taken.331 Illegal secondary use of data, the sanction under the GDPR would
for  example  be  2%,  or  as  the  EU  Parliament  proposes  as  high  as  5%  of  global  annual
turnover. The basis in these cases could be that the processing has been done without
sufficient legal basis.332
After this analysis of sanctions in both EU and US it becomes apparent that they both have
problems balancing privacy with economic interests. In the EU there are big problems with
complying with the DPD, the GDPR will increase the sanction but only future will show if
it helps. In the US the privacy laws are fragmented across sector. Even though the current
328There is, for example, a European class actions against Facebook, Lomas 2014.
329Solove and Hartzog, 2014 p. 590 – 592 and Solove and Schwartz 2009, for privacy torts.
330The problem in this aspect is that there are not so many monetary interests behind the protection of
privacy, Lessig 2006, p. 200.
331An interesting question regarding the secondary use of data is in connection with the situations where the
secondary use of data is conducted by external parties. This would be especially when sanctions would be
due the actions of an external 3-party; conducting analytics for example on basis of an agreement. This theme
will not be further analyzed however, since it falls outside of the scope of this thesis.
332 GDPR, p. 93.
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FTC monetary sanctions trump their European equivalents, even these sanctions and
enforcement actions have problems.
As stated, there are some pitfalls when strengthening the enforcement of data protection.
First  the  DPAs  do  not  most  likely  have  the  resources  for  enforcing  all  no-compliant
behavior, high sanctions in a selective manner is unlikely to solve the problem of non-
compliant secondary use of data. This creates a problem with good administration, since all
should be equal in front of the officials. Second, the sanctions could affect small-business
companies that try to enter the market, a big repeat-player company, could most likely
survive from the sudden change of regulatory environment. Thirdly, the enforcement costs
will  most  likely  be  pulverized  down  to  consumers.  For  these  reasons,  I  see  that  the
proposed GDPR and the sanctions increase the need for risk-based regulation.
The next chapter will analyze the regulation of privacy from a risk-based perspective,
which would in collaboration with sanctions effectively solve the fundamental rights
conflict. The first subchapter will analyze regulation of privacy more generally, and
provide insights to privacy regulation from three different perspectives; from the economic
perspective of privacy, from the perspective of privacy as a common right and from the
idea of law as code. These ideas will be explored briefly to frame the effectivity of the risk-
based approach.
5 Risk-based Regulation of Data Use
5.1 Economic Theory of Privacy
Regulation of cyberspace is problematic, since legislation is often national; the World
Wide Web has created problems, challenges, risks and opportunities that are international.
It is important to notice certain economic factors behind privacy when analyzing the
regulation of data protection. Without understanding the economic aspects of privacy, it is
impossible to navigate towards satisfactory privacy regulation, which could answer the
different needs of different interest groups, and balance the fundamental rights in conflict. I
will next analyze how economists have viewed privacy; the analysis is used for bringing
economic input to the discussion of regulating privacy. The economic view of privacy
differs highly from the view of privacy as a fundamental right.333
333 The right to privacy as a fundamental right was explored in the subchapter 2.1.
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According to the analysis of Acquisti, the most traditional neoclassic economics literature
on privacy states that consumers are rationally informed agents with stable privacy
preferences.334 The traditional models also state that privacy is not itself a value, but an
economic benefit that it confers.335 In the economic model of the Chicago school, privacy
can be seen as a mere cause for inefficiency, since people likely disclose only information
that is beneficial to them. Especially Posner views privacy in highly critical light: his
perspective is that privacy should only have value when it is essential for the protection of
trade secrets. In addition Posner also views privacy as a harmful right – since it allows
consumers to hide facts that might affect, for example, the decisions of insurers.336
Calzolari and Pavan have studied the effects of information disclosure about consumers,
and concluded that the consumer does not necessarily suffer from such practices and that in
the end the disclosure of data between parties may add to the total welfare of all parties
involved.337 Varian has claimed that if privacy is regulated without taking the economic
aspects into account, this may lead to overly strict solutions that lead to the loss of welfare.
This is well in line with the fact that Internet services are currently financed mainly by
data-driven advertising.338 The risk-based approach to privacy would better include these
economic factors to the regulatory process. It is important to understand the role personal
data plays in the online economy. Especially if the sanctions proposed in the GDPR enter
into force, the effects in the online economy and welfare of the e-consumers might be
surprising. The increased sanctions and their costs might be driven down to the consumers,
which could cause monetary losses to the consumers.
Privacy as a collective right or privacy commons is another idea that should be considered
de lege ferenda. Karl Muth states that privacy can be seen as a collective right, which can
be understood similarly as a natural resource. This view of Karl Muths is especially useful
when using enforcement examples from, for example, environmental regulation.339 Risk-
based regulation is already used widely in different jurisdictions and different fields of
regulation, especially in environmental law and financial markets regulation. The risk-
based regulation approach is well in line with the social theory that we the current modern
334Acquisti, 2010, p. 4
335Acquisti, Leslie and Loewenstein 2009, p.5.
336Posner, 1978, p. 22 and Posner 1998, p. 44 - 45.
337 I use the term welfare here to mean the economic benefit in total to all parties involved in the online
economy, the consumer or buyer (or data subject) and the different parties selling. Calzolari and Pavan 2006,
p. 2 - 4, 22.
338 Deighton and Quelch, 2009, pp. 23 – 25 and Varian, 1996
339Muth 2009, pp. 346 - 348 and Bennett and Raab 2006, p. 11.
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society could be classified as a risk society.340 As Muth also states, there is a clear analogy
to be made between environmental law and privacy legislation.341 Thus,  I  see  it  as  only
logical to use a similar risk-based approach on the regulation of privacy. Several
problematic issues, however, arise from a risk-based approach to legislation.342
The third theoretical part behind the de lege ferenda analysis is the Lawrence Lessig’s idea
of regulating cyberspace. Lessig’s idea is that the regulation of the Internet needs to take
into account the code, and that the regulation of cyberspace can be built into the code.343
This idea should especially be taken into account when considering how to regulate
anonymization. In anonymization, the question is precisely about that; code is made so that
the personal data saved is in a form where privacy is not at harm. The view also concerns
the secondary use of data, which is of technical nature. In extreme, the privacy decisions
could be included with the data used as metadata, all data could technically contain a label
that informs about the risk-classification and the legality of the data use.344 This data
labeling would be a technical solution that would facilitate the use of data, while protecting
privacy. The discussion of regulating code is well in line with the statement of Baldwin; it
is hard to distinguish technical and social risks, since in the end, people have created the
technical risks in cyberspace.345
The next subchapter will explore risk-based regulation. The difference between the
concepts of risk-based approach and risk-based regulation need to be clarified. The first
means purely taking the risk as the primary point of regulation and regulating to control a
certain risk, for example, against harm caused to the data subjects. Risk-based regulation,
on the other hand, is a more complex concept, that also includes other aspects such as
monitoring the effectiveness of regulation by seeing what are the identified risks and how
does the applied regulation then affect them.346 The  goal  is  to  show  why  the  regulator
should take ideas from the risk-based regulation and then apply the risk-based approach to
340Beck 1992, p. 1.
341Muth 2009, pp. 350 - 352.
342Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, pp. 91 - 93.
343Lessig discusses the possibility of regulating internet in a way that anyone there could be identified, and
thus increasing the ability to regulate cyberspace. Lessig, cop. 2006, p. 62, 66 - 69. See also Rule, 2007, p.
19.
344Lessig brings out the possibility that technical solutions could help treating privacy in similar way to a
property right. A technical solution could allow users consenting for the data uses. This idea has a lot of
beneficial aspects, but it might be from economic and politic perspective to re-engineer cyberspace in such
way. Lessig 2006, pp. 227 - 230.
345Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p. 83.
346This is how I use these concepts in this chapter, for the different aspects of risk-based regulation see Black,
2012a, p. 1, chapter 14.1.
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secondary use of data. The 5.2 subchapter explores the risk-based regulation from the
perspective of the regulator. The 5.3 then applies the lessons learned and creates a data
classification model that would push risk-management duties to the data controllers and in
return liberate certain parts of secondary data use. My analysis is done with taking the risk
as the starting point for regulatory actions, however, the risk-based approach to regulation
has immense benefits and most of these would be useful in the field of privacy. 347
5.2 Risk-based Regulation
The risk-based regulation of data protection, means seeing the regulator in the role of a
risk-manager or allocator of risks. This includes deciding which risks the data controllers
may take and how do the safeguards applied affect the potential use of data. Risk-based
regulation is an approach of applying risk-management processes both to the regulation as
activity, and using risk as the key concept for understanding the regulated subject.348
According to Pounds, the risk-based approach is characterized by understanding that not
every risk can be regulated, and the legislator should acknowledge and analyze different
risks.349 The legislator or the state can be seen as the ultimate risk manager. Power has
claimed that the state, as the regulator, has not been aware of this duty for long.350 Control
of risks can be seen as the object of regulation.351 Societal risk is a scenario where a party
has  the  possibility  of  losing  their  right;  as  such,  the  loss  of  privacy  is  a  risk  for  data
subjects.352 The essence of risk-based regulation is the prioritization of regulatory actions
in accordance with the risks associated; the goal for risk-based frameworks is to control
relevant risks, instead of looking for compliance with a set of rules.353
The risk-based regulation affects all of the steps in regulation, starting from the planning of
new regulation and ending in the enforcement actions that can be accordingly targeted in
the highest areas of risk. According to Black and Baldwin, there are five common aspects
in the risk-based frameworks.  Firstly is  the control of risk.  Secondly,  the regulators scale
347It is important to make an important distinction in this point, in the corporate privacy management there
are multiple risk-assessments processes for controlling privacy and security risks – the intention of this
chapter is not to analyze those, they are left outside the scope of this thesis. These processes are internal
measures of the data controllers and not in the field of regulatory analysis.
348Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, p. 281, Black, 2010b, p. 187 and Bounds, 2010, p. 32.
349 Gregory Bounds, 2010, pp. 16 - 17.
350Power, 2004, p. 17.
351Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p. 83.
352See 1.3 for the role of risk in the methodology of this thesis.
353 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p. 281.
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for accepting risks. Thirdly, the frameworks involve assessing the hazards or adverse
effects. Two broad categories of risks are classified; inherent risks and management and
control risks. Fourthly, the risks are scored so they can be assessed. Lastly, the risk-based
framework provides means for linking the risk assessment with enforcement – since
resource allocation is an important part of risk frameworks. It is however important to
notice that according to Baldwin and Black, no risk-based system is identical and that the
creation of such frameworks is not merely a technical process. Meaning that the creation of
such frameworks includes decisions that later affect the whole system created by the use of
the frameworks.354
A good example  of  Risk-Based  Frameworks  for  regulation  is  the  IRGC framework.  It  is
intended to be used as a general tool for multiple areas of regulation that include
technology or natural risks. The framework contains five areas; 1) Risk Pre-Assessment 2)
Risk  Appraisal  3)  Characterization  and  evaluation  4)  Risk  Management  and  5)  Risk
Communication.355 Practical examples of applying risk-based regulation can also be found
from the areas of the financial sector and environmental regulation. In the UK risk-based
regulation is widely used especially after the Hampton Review recommended such
measures to be taken in the areas of enforcement.356 After the early adaptation of risk-
based regulation, its use has multiplied, especially in the financial markets regulation and
environmental regulation.357 Fisher has noted that in these areas the regulator needs
knowledge from multiple areas to first assess the risks and later to regulate and enforce the
subject.358 This would also apply to the regulation of data use and data protection, expertise
is required to various fields.
Benefits of the risk-based approach for the regulator are significant. First, the regulator has
the possibility for savings since the regulatory activities are better aimed and second, the
regulation may have less effect on the efficiency of markets. The third argument is that
risk-based regulation adds accountability to the regulatory activities since, as the goals are
clearly defined, it is easy to notice whether the regulatory systems work.359 These however
are big promises, since in essence the risk-based approach to regulation promises of
354Black and Baldwin, 2010, pp. 184 - 185.
355 IRGC 2008, Risk Governance Framework, p. 8 - 14.
356 Hampton 2005, p. 9 - 10.
357 For example Canadian Banking Regulator, the Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI),
Portugal’s environmental regulator IFAOT has adopted the risk-based models developed in the UK. Black
and Baldwin, 2010, pp. 183 - 184.
358Elizabeth Dr Fisher, 2010, p. 51.
359Black 2010b, pp. 188 - 189 and Bounds, 2010, p. 32.
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converting regulation, which has been often seen as an art-like operation to something that
can be monitored and assessed.360 It  is  only  natural  that  the  risk-based  approach  to
regulation has also been criticized, and even described as simply dressing old regulatory
processes in new clothes.361 The critique affects multiple areas of the approach. According
to Black & Baldwin the creation of risk-based frameworks require a lot of information
about the regulated subjects.362
Several factors should be considered when creating a risk-based regulatory system. First of
all the level of risk tolerance needs to be considered – this varies often sector by sector. For
example, in the food safety regulation there is a zero tolerance for risks, in the financial
sectors regulation the appetite of risks is much higher.363 In my opinion the risk tolerance
for data protection regulation falls somewhere in middle, most likely nearer the food
regulation, however in the area of data protection there are several different areas in which
the risk tolerance and goals are different. The second aspect that needs to be considered are
the risks and how they can be identified. The relevant risks need to be noted and assessed;
the regulator has to concentrate on concrete risks that are identifiable.364 In the area of data
protection the loss of data subjects privacy acts as the core risk, however, the quantification
of the risk can be done by analyzing the quality of data and then by the amount of data. If
the loss of data would lead to discrimination of the individual or to losses of democracy,
the risk is considerable.365 Additionally if the loss of data can lead to psychic or physical
harm, the loss of the data creates considerable risks. After the risks have been identified
and the risk tolerance has been chosen, the regulator needs to set risk indicators and assess
the probability of the risks.366 This helps deciding which of the risks can be transferred to
the data controllers via legislation.
The risk-based approach to data protection would better solve the fundamental rights
conflict caused by the dual nature of data protection laws. Data protection laws have the
aim  of  solving  the  fundamental  rights  conflict.  The  economic  side  of  the  issue  has  only
emerged recently, and for that reason a new risk-based approach would benefit the
360Part of the critique states that the financial crisis proves that risk-assessment and management practices are
unreliable and that they create the false sense of security; Black and Baldwin, 2010, pp. 203 - 204.
361Black, 2010b, 188.
362Baldwin and Black offer a really responsive risk-based system, which responds to problems by using a
variation of the risk-based regulation, Black and Baldwin 2010, pp. 198 - 199.
363Black 2010b, 193
364Black 2010b, 194
365Ojanen, 2010, p. 43 - 44.
366Black 2010b, p. 195 -196
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legislator. As the data controller carries the profits of data processing, the controller should
also carry the risk. The risk-based approach, in connection with the strong enforcement
proposed by the GDPR, would create a system that is has fewer administrative burdens and
allow data subjects’ fundamental right to privacy to be fulfilled. It should be noted that in
an ideal scenario, regulation is something that allows and encourages activities such as
commercial use of data, instead of only putting limits on behavior. This works both ways,
for example by potentially empowering individuals for privacy activism, which can be
done by granting access rights.367 The Center for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL),
has already created initial proposals for adopting the risk-based approach to privacy,
however the initial draft frameworks do not completely fulfil the idea of risk-based
regulation.368 The CIPL frameworks aim to include the control of privacy risks to privacy
regulation. They do not, for example, include other aspects of a risk-based regulation, such
as the increased accountability of regulation.
The goal of the next subchapter is to view how a risk-based regulatory approach could be
applied to design data protection regulation of data use de lege ferenda. Such  a  model  is
needed since the regulation of cyberspace has to take into account the conflicting
fundamental rights and the realities of the online economy.
5.3 Risk-based Model for Data Use
I previously have explored the problems current regulation has in relation with the purpose
limitation, anonymization and its possible failure and the failures in the field of data
protection enforcement.369 The  use  of  data  could  be  regulated  by  using  a  risk-based
approach and by classifying data in several risk-categories. This categorization could be
used for setting the obligations and guidance’s for the data controllers. The model would
partly the fundamental rights conflict and fit the ideas of law as code and the regulation of
privacy commons together. The fact that privacy regulation has economic effects has to be
taken into account. In the model that I explore and propose, the goal is that data could be
used as freely as possible and that at the same time the individual’s privacy would be
367Bennett and Raab 2006, p. 121 - 122.
368 CIPL, 2014a A Risk-based Approach to Privacy? An Initial Issues Paper for Privacy Risk Framework and
CIPL, 2014b, Risk-based Approach to Privacy Project and A Risk-based Approach to Privacy: Improving
Effectiveness in Practice.
369Subchapters 2.4, 2.5 and 3.1.
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safeguarded – this would both take care of the fundamental rights concerns and also ensure
the maximum economic welfare.
CIPL has already drafted a preliminary risk-based approach.  Their risk-based approach
aims to reduce the harm that might be caused to data subjects, instead of only protecting
privacy as a fundamental right. CIPL classifies harm as all potential damages, injuries or
negative impacts to the data subjects; this classification includes for example monetary or
reputational damages.370 CIPL further classifies the harms to three categories; tangible
damages, intangible distress and societal harm.371 The  CIPL  framework  is  intended  for
controlling the significant privacy risks and it is meant to be used alongside the current
data protection laws and legal instruments.372 WP 29 has commented on the recent
discussion on the risk-based approach, raising the point that the current regulation should
not be abandoned, and that the risk-based elements are already involved in the regulatory
process.373 WP  29  has  also  commented  that  in  all  scenarios,  fundamental  rights  of  data
subjects need to be safeguarded even though the risks in question would be small.374 In my
opinion, the WP 29 does not fully take into the account the economic needs for data use,
also ignoring the fact that the current system does not protect the fundamental rights due
failures in enforcement. After the GDPR fixes the problems in the enforcement system, the
de facto balancing of privacy and economic interests needs new tools, and the risk-based
approach could be one of these tools.375 I would not however advocate for abandoning the
current systems completely, the risk-based approach could be tried out in several areas and
the testing could lead to expanding to other areas as well. The data controllers have their
fundamental rights and there are economic benefits in the use of data for both the economy
in general and consumers alike.376 The risk-based approach works well in certain areas of
data protection, and the secondary use of data is one of those areas. Correct levels of
sanctions in connection with a risk-based framework will also further ensure compliance
with the rules in connection with the data.
370CIPL 2014b, pp. 1 -2 and CIPLa, pp. 1 - 3.
371 Tangible is physical or economic harm, intangible distress is, for example, reputational harm or
discrimination, societal harm is damage to the democratic institutions or social trust, see more, CIPL 2014b,
7.
372 CIPL 2014b, p. 2.
373WP 29 2014, Statement on the role of a risk-based approach, p. 1.
374WP 29 2014, Statement, p. 2.
375 See chapter 4.4 for the future sanctions that will have big economic impacts to data processing.
376As discussed previously in subchapter 2.1.
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The next goal of this subchapter is to create a model for classifying the risks and regulating
data use according to this model. The previously explored CIPL material gives good input
for understanding the harm in question.377 In addition, the risk-based regulation provides
input  to  the  data  use  mode.  According  to  Bounds,  the  first  phase  of  risk  assessment  is
framing  and  forecasting  the  probabilities  of  risk.  In  this  context,  there  are  two risks:  the
first, being the loss of data subjects and the second being the loss of commercial benefits to
the data controllers and consumers alike. The second phase of the assessment is then
managing the risks by taking action. The control of risk can be classified in four categories:
risk avoidance, reduction, retention and transfer of risks. Risk avoidance, in practice,
means prohibiting certain activities, retention means accepting the risk, transfer means the
transfer of the risk to private parties and reduction is the strategic measures to reduce
risk.378Also as CIPL has noted, it is important to take into account the fact that the privacy
risks of different phases of data processing are different.379 At this point, it is important to
note that enforcement and sanctions have an important function ensuring that the risks
taken are included in the framework.
As the second phase of the assessment process proposed by Bounds. The legislator should
classify categories of personal data. Certain types of data do not contain potential harm for
data subjects, in this first category; the commercial use of data would be free and
acceptable. Data that would fall into this category would be, for example, ordinary data of
the buyer such as age and address. In the second category, the data use would be limited
and anonymization of the data would be required as a prerequisite for the data use. In
addition, the regulator would then give guidance in the possible techniques of
anonymization. The measures of control could in this category include: limiting disclosure
of data to only parties that are deemed as safe, access controls and certain internal
procedures.380 In the third category, the data use would be prohibited due to the high risks.
These high risks would apply to data that is so highly confidential to the individual or of
377Interestingly the CIPL also notes that the different privacy risks are not classified well. CIPL, 2014b, p. 4 –
5. This in my opinion calls for additional research in the area of different risks, since if regulation is done
without knowing the risks the resources are focused in wrong areas, Hampton 2006, p. 43.
378 Bounds 2010, p. 19.
379 CIPL 2014b, p. 5.
380See the safeguards proposed by the working party for the legitimate interests balancing test, WP 29,
Opinion 06/2014, p. 42.  In addition, CNIL 2014a, p. 12 – 18 on assessing the possible risks to the collected
data in the role of data controller and on the measures the controller should take CNIL 2014b, p. 4 - 24.
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sensitive nature. The classification could be made EU-wide in the regulation, which would
then also benefit the free flow of data.381
The following picture demonstrates the categories of data in the model:
Picture 4.1
Low Risk Medium risk High risk
The risk classification in this model would follow and fulfil the fundamental rights
protected by data protection regimens. For example, in the first category, the loss of rights
is considered low, and in fact allowing the data use does not cause risk of rights loss to the
data subjects. In the second category the additional safeguards guarantee the rights of the
data subjects, while simultaneously allowing some economic activities.382 In  the  third
category there would be high risk of loss of privacy and for this reason the commercial
data use is prohibited. This category would include the commercial uses of sensitive data,
which would have high risks for discrimination of the individuals. The model would
especially clarify the situation with anonymization and ordinary data, making it possible to
use more data while simultaneously mitigating the risks in connection with the data use.
Enforcement would be directed so that the sanctions would be highest for the third
category data use; also, if safeguards would not be used in the second category, the DPA
could fine the data controller.
The model interacts in two ways with anonymization. First of all, the anonymization
process can be used as part of the framework to reduce risk, thus allowing certain data
uses, which, considering the data subjects fundamental rights, would otherwise be
classified as too risky. Additionally risk-based approach can be used to assess the
anonymization practices, to see whether they are effective or not. This would serve the
381 There are of course types of data that are considered more confidential in some EU countries than in
others. For example, membership in labor unions is such information. The model would require
harmonization of data protection across EU.
382 This is also, in line with what has been discussed about the devaluation of data in subchapter 3.3.
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better regulation of anonymization practices. Firstly, anonymization can be used as a
solution to reduce risk; secondly, anonymization practices can be recommended by
regulators to be used in certain situations and thirdly, it a may be required that a certain
anonymization method reduces a certain amount of risk. Although risk-based approach to
anonymization standards would probably be the best possible option, there are several
problems  with  this  approach.  It  may  even  be  impossible  to  assess  the  risk  of  re-
identification correctly.383 ICO already stresses the importance of risk analysis as a part of
the anonymization process.384 The risk assessment is done by conducting the motivated
intruder test, which is used as mean to assess whether anonymization is conducted
properly.385 De lege ferenda, the correct way of regulating anonymization should be as
technology-neutral as possible. The correct level of anonymization is set in a point where
the  value  of  data  can  be  kept  as  high  as  possible  and  re-identification  of  risk  as  low  as
possible. When setting the minimum for anonymization de lege ferenda, the legislator
should consider the amount that the risks decrease by as well as the increased cost of
implementing the technology and the lowered value of data. From the perspective of the
risk-based framework, the best regulatory solution would set the guidance for selecting
anonymization techniques and assessing the risks, the data controllers could then choose
the techniques that they may want to apply. If the GDPR enters into force, this task would
be best set to an advisory body consisting of WP 29 and the required technical expertise.386
The risk-based approach could be also designed to interact with the purpose restriction.
The  problem  with  purpose  restriction  is  that  it  is  both  too  vague  and  strict.  It  does  not
provide real safeguards for the data subjects.387 De lege ferenda, risk could be included as
part of the purpose restriction or a as a new data protection principle; “Risk based
processing”. The risk based processing principle would add that data may be processed for
other than areas that are within the purpose, if they are low risk or considered as such after
the successful anonymization process. As a hot-fix I would propose the following
modifications to the language of the purpose restriction:
383 It is general hard to quantify risk and there is always the possibility that not all risks are taken to account.
384ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk, p. 18. In general, it should be noted that
assessing risks is nearly impossible, since some situations are so called Black Swans that might be impossible
to predict. About “black swans” and highly improbable situations, Taleb, 2008.
385The motivated intruder test is simple; the question should be asked whether a motivated intruder could
achieve re-identification, if they are motivated enough. ICO 2012, Anonymisation: managing data protection
risk code of practice, pp. 22 - 24.
386 Much like in the UK, where UKAN assists with anonymization relating questions UK Anonymization
Network 2014, About Anonymisation: for data about people.
387 The chapter 2.4 has provided the problems to in connection with purpose restriction.
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GDPR article 5 (bold section added by the author):
“(b)  collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes, further processing of
low-risk and medium-risk data categories may be accepted if necessary
safeguards are employed;”
The fix would implement the concept of risk to the GDPR. The risk assessment could be
modelled after the balancing guidelines that WP 29 has already given in relation with the
article 7(f).388  In fact, the WP 29 has proposed similar measures for amending the purpose
restriction, also concentrating on the safe guards of the data. The intention of WP 29 is
similar;  the  approach  would  allow  the  use  of  data  and  more  flexibility  with  the  purpose
limitation.389 In my opinion, the risk-based approach would fulfill  the same goal.   In this
context, it should be noted that the DPD already contains elements that could easily be
modified  to  be  even  more  responsive  for  the  potential  risks  and  the  control  of  risks.  The
article 7(f) balancing test introduced by the WP 29 is good example of this.390
The risk-based approach to data use cannot really survive without the functioning
enforcement coupled with strict sanctions. This is because there should always be
regulation in place to limit taking risks that are not acceptable. Without the reform of data
protection enforcement, the risk-based approach is doomed to fail in safeguarding the data
subject’s privacy. Without proper enforcement it will act only as a justification for going
against the fundamental rights of data subjects. The risk based-approach to data protection
has problems, and if such systems would be put on practical use as a regulation even more
problems would probably be found. As also Baldwin states, it is often hard to predict and
measure the efficiency of regulatory solutions; regulatory assessment is easier after the
effects have been seen in practice.391 I would however see it important that the current
system of regulating the secondary use of data would be reconsidered. In my opinion, this
should be done at the same time as changing the sanction mechanisms and data protection
enforcement. Since as proven, the current purpose restriction and legitimate interests
ground, even in combination with anonymization, does not solve the conflict of
fundamental rights in this area and allow data operations.392
388 WP 29, 06/2014, p. 55.
389WP 29, Opinion 03/2013, p. 42.
390WP 29, Opinion 06/2014, pp. 33 and 55 and CIPL 2014c, p. 7.
391For measuring regulatory quality see, Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2012, pp. 34 - 38.
392 See chapters 2.4, 2.5, 3.2 and 3.3.
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6 Conclusions
Data protection legislation is at a crossroads. The choices are either evolving or staying put
and becoming a dead letter of law. The current regulation does not satisfy the economic
needs of the era of big data. Neither does it sufficiently safeguard the privacy of
consumers, since there are major shortcomings in the area of enforcement and sanctions.
The Regulators ignore both the fundamental rights conflict and the economic realities in
connection with the online economy and the need for data use. Currently the commercial
secondary use of data is done majorly via anonymization, which allows escape from
burdensome restrictions. The increasing value of data further heightens these problems and
conflicts of interest. There is a high risk that without proper enforcement consumers suffer
losses  of  privacy.  Additionally  the  risk  of  re-identification  looms  above  the  use  of
anonymization techniques. These times of fast change call for new perspectives in the
regulation of privacy as analyzed in chapter 1 and subchapter 2.1. The fundamental rights
conflict, which is worsened due to fast changes in technology and online economy, is not
currently solved by the DPD.
I have treated the commercial secondary use of data primarily from the perspective of
purpose restriction and the legitimacy of data use. The thesis has analyzed the DPD article
6 and DPD article 7(a) and 7(f). In addition, the Member State implementations have been
viewed. Anonymization has also been explored as a potential safeguard and a solution to
the value of data. The enforcement of data protection has gained much attention since the
economic analysis of law shows that high rewards of non-compliant behavior increase non-
compliance. Additionally, enforcement has an important role as part of the solution for
data use. In Europe, the sanctions are weak and they are only randomly imposed. Even
though the proposed GDPR repairs many of the areas with sanctions, it leaves the rules for
data use nearly unchanged, or even further restricting the use of data. This is especially
problematic and calls for new approaches with privacy regulation. An ideal privacy
regulation takes into account the different needs and the economic effects of such
regulation to the welfare of the society. The regulation should safeguard individuals’
privacy – without imposing too excessive restrictions to the ability to use data. This thesis
has explored how the risk-based approach would provide answers in the various
problematic areas of the regulation. The risk-based approach would prima facie solve  a
large portion of the problems in the area of commercial secondary use of data.
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In the second chapter of this thesis, I treated the problems for potential secondary use of
data caused by the current DPD. A main problem in relation with big data and the
commercial secondary use of data is the inflexibility of purpose limitation. The principle
limits the use of data in many cases where there is no potential risk for harm to the data
subjects. This is especially problematic, since a lot of data falls under the scope of personal
data  and  thus  it  is  governed  by  the  DPD.  This  also  causes  problems with  DPD article  7,
especially in relation with consent and legitimate interest for data use. Even though WP 29
has given out guidance for utilizing the balancing test of article 7(f) and adding some
flexibility for repurposing of data, this is not alone enough to solve the problems. In a
scenario of high sanctions and effective enforcement, this inflexibility of the regulation
would be especially problematic. Consent is an especially problematic basis for secondary
use of data.
I have analyzed anonymization deriving from the DPA guidance’s and WP 29 guidance in
chapter 3. Anonymization has been, and will in future be, a good solution for facilitating
secondary use of data. It also plays an important role in the risk-based approach. However,
there are multiple questions in relation with anonymization. First, the risk of re-
identification challenges the usability of many techniques, and second, there is also the risk
that robust anonymization techniques decrease the value too much. The risk of
reidentification is hard to control, since the technology around anonymization changes
frequently. Even though there is a risk of reidentification and the value of data is
devaluated after anonymization, I see that the role of anonymization will not diminish.
Many uses of personal data would be impossible without the use of anonymization and it is
possible to add additional safety to ordinary use and disclosure of personal data by
carefully selecting anonymization techniques. Organizational safeguards, such as access
control and limiting the disclosure of the data may be the solution for anonymization in the
context of secondary use of data. Current and future sanctions have been analyzed in
chapter 4 of this thesis. The sanctions were found to be insufficient, considering the high
value of data. The FTC enforcement was explored, and especially the use of consent order
could be explored in the European concept. The monetary effectivity of sanctions should
be improved, the future GDPR harmonization will improve the situation in regards with
enforcement and sanctions.
The risk-based regulation has been explored in chapter 5 of this thesis. Risk-based
approach to privacy regulation would de lege ferenda support the regulator in creating
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regulatory solutions that balance the fundamental rights conflict. A risk-based approach to
privacy would focus the regulatory actions to the correct points, where the privacy of the
data subjects can be best safeguarded, without losing the potential and value of data. The
risk-based model for data use would allow certain uses of data, allowing the restrictions
caused by the purpose limitation principle to be ignored. In turn, the model would also take
the power of anonymization into consideration and use it to allow data activities that only
have mitigable risks. Some commercial activities with data would be prohibited in cases
where the risks to data subjects are too high. The risk-based approach would act in
combination with the proposed sanctions in the GDPR. This would balance the conflict of
fundamental rights; also taking into account the societal and welfare benefits data use
apply across the economy and societies.
The risk-based approach to commercial secondary use could act as a new regulatory tool
for solving the fundamental rights conflict of the big data era. Such new approaches are
needed so that the privacy of individuals remains as a functioning fundamental right.
Future research would be needed for assessing the correct areas where the framework
could be applied. The risk-based approach might not be the solution for all data protection,
nor should it be advocated as the solution for everything. Future studies would also be
needed in the analysis of data protection sanctions. It would be especially beneficial to
analyze the monetary effects even more.
I see that data protection regulation is more important than ever as the consumers have the
right to privacy. At the same time, an effective data protection regulation safeguards also
the general welfare and acts as a basis for economic activities. New legal innovations
should  be  put  to  use  for  the  protection  of  privacy  during  this  era  of  fast  technological
change – privacy is not dead, it is evolving to the next level.
